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
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
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1. REPORT NUMBER AFIT/CI/NR 82-87T	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Red Brigades: A Description Of A Terrorist Organization		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED THESIS/DISSERTATION
7. AUTHOR(s) Larry Allen Buckingham		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AFIT STUDENT AT: California State University, Sacramento		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS AFIT/NR WPAFB OH 45433		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
12. REPORT DATE August 1982		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 110
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASS
15a. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: IAW AFR 190-17 3 Oct 1983 Lynn E. Wolaver Dean for Research and Professional Development		
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Abstract  
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THE RED BRIGADES:  
A DESCRIPTION OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION  
by

Larry Allen Buckingham  
Captain, USAF  
1982: 110 pages  
Master of Arts in Criminal Justice  
California State University at Sacramento

A review of current literature on active terrorist or revolutionary organizations reveals minimal information for analyzing the Red Brigades (BR) of Italy. Questions such as how they are organized, the number of active members, their age, origin, educational background, and political orientation are largely unanswered in a collective form. The purpose of this study is to present a descriptive analysis of the Red Brigades. A secondary purpose is to present a study which enables the criminologist, sociologist, and politician to better understand the organization in order to develop techniques for dealing with the demands for social and governmental change through terrorist activity.

The scope of this study will include a systematic review of the popular literature (US, Italian, and German) on the topic. Although, the majority of material published on the group deals with the sensationalism of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination and the General Dozier abduction, other documents do exist in scattered form. By compiling and analysing these items, a better view of the BR was obtained.

The Red Brigades are a highly active, well equipped,

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disciplined, and strongly effective terrorist organization. Their role in the Italian Left began as a part of the social unrest of the late 1960's. The majority of members have prior connections to the Italian Communist Party, and tend to follow a Marxist-Leninist ideology. The continued life of the group can be tied to a low-level of support from many young Italians. Outside of Italy, the group has many international ties to other terrorist groups and Soviet bloc countries, which also provide additional support for the group's acts. Because of past successes and the strong operational base the group has established in both national and international arenas, operations by the group can be expected to continue.



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
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THE RED BRIGADES:  
A DESCRIPTION OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

Larry Allen Buckingham  
B.S., Washington State University, Pullman, 1974

THESIS

Submitted in partial satisfaction of  
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

IN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

AT

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO



THE RED BRIGADES:  
A DESCRIPTION OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

A Thesis

by

Larry Allen Buckingham

Approved by:

*James M. Poland*, Chair  
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*Thomas R. Phelps*, Second Reader  
Dr. Thomas R. Phelps

Date: *2 August 1982*

Name of Student: LARRY ALLEN BUCKINGHAM

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The Red Brigades are a highly active, well equipped,

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#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. James M. Poland and Dr. Thomas R. Phelps for their invaluable assistance in the completion of this project. I also wish to acknowledge Mr. Robert Price without whose research assistance and encouragement this project would never have been completed.

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Christi and my sons, Scott and Craig, whose encouragement and faith helped to make the completion of this project a reality. This endeavor is the work of a family and its being belongs to that family.

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## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

Thus from all sides the aversion and the political disassociation vis-a-vis the Red Brigades...excludes any will (and capacity) to understand their roots, their questions, their errors, and the lessons to be drawn therefrom...<sup>1</sup>

Today's world is one where violence has become the norm for many people seeking to reform their environment. What makes-up that wanting environment, whether political, social, economic, or any combination of, seems to matter very little. Violence appears to have become the "change-key" for those who see no other way to gain transformation. As Michael Selzer makes a point of in his work, the Terrorist Chic, "we, as a people, seem to have become obsessed with violence".<sup>2</sup> In the political arena that obsession has gained not a new title, but one that resounds of the violence within. That pealing epithet is filled by one word: TERRORISM.

Criminologists, sociologists, and politicians, the world over, are confronted by acts of terrorism and more important the reality of how to stop such acts. Indeed to complicate the problem, there is even talk, and considerable evidence, of the existence of an international terrorist network capable of coordinating the many different groups and

conducting well organized terrorists acts.

The terrorist groups that have joined to form an international dealership in terror are for the most part well-known and documented. However, one group that is held in high regard by fellow member groups of the network, receives little attention, or for that matter, very little study. This group is Italy's "la Brigata Rosse, or the Red Brigades".

The question might be asked, "Why, if the group is respected within terrorist circles, isn't more known or directed study about the group accomplished?". Part of the reason for the lack of apparent interest lies in the position or location of the group in the highly active terrorist belt of Europe and the Middle East. The Red Brigades suffer, at least publicity-wise, from the overshadowing of groups to the north and south: groups like, the Baader-Meinhof Gang/Red Army Faction (Germany); the Irish Republican Army (Northern Ireland); and the Palistine Liberation Organization (operating throughout the Mid-east). The Red Brigades have taken the proverbial "backseat" to these other groups. Hence, little study has been truly directed at them.

The second part of the reason may be found in the attitude of many political, law enforcement, and scholarly types fostered by what they perceive of the government and police agencies of Italy. Many people believe the successes of the Red Brigades to be a direct reflection of the perceived incompetence of the Italian authorities. People look at Italy with the idea that the whole country and its people operate

on a "sempre domani"<sup>3</sup> attitude. Alessandro Silj points to this perception in his discussion of the Aldo Moro kidnap/assassination. He states,

...the whole thing had to be masterminded by some foreign brain and executed with participation of some foreign killers—Italians simply cannot be that efficient.<sup>4</sup>

Whatever the reason, there is an unmistakeable void in the collective information concerning this group. How serious a threat they pose to world order is difficult to determine; however, their noted role in transnational terrorist dealings points to a level of importance too great to ignore. This thesis will be an attempt to produce a composite, pictorial description of the Red Brigades to fill that gap in the existing literature.

#### Statement of Problem

A review of current literature on active terrorist or revolutionary organizations reveals minimal compiled, or composite, information for analyzing the Red Brigades of Italy. Questions such as how the group is organized, political orientation, capabilities, member strength, future intents, etc. have been addressed; however, the materials exist in a disassociated, scattered form. The existence of the Red Brigades is a problem of grand proportions in itself, but it is complicated again by dismembered data and observations.

#### Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to present an up-to-date,

complete descriptive analysis of the Red Brigades. A natural derivation of this type of study will be to enable the criminologist, sociologist, and politician to better understand the Red Brigades organization in order to develop techniques for dealing with its demands for social and governmental change through terrorist activity.

#### Scope and Limitations of Study

The scope of this study will include a systematic review of the popular literature (US, Italian, and German) on the topic of the Red Brigades. Although, the majority of material published on the group deals with the sensationalism of the Aldo Moro kidnapping/assassination<sup>5</sup> and the kidnapping of US Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier<sup>6</sup>, other documents and writings do exist in a scattered form. By compiling and analyzing these items, a better view of the Red Brigades will be obtained.

The scope of this study will be limited to information that provides a systematic description of the Red Brigades. Interrelationships with other terrorist and revolutionary groups that have influenced its development must be mentioned in order to view the Red Brigades in the context of the transnational terrorist movement. However, these groups will only be covered in sufficient detail to enable the reader to observe that the Red Brigades did not develop in a social/political void and certainly do not exist in one.

A study dealing with the description of an active

underground terrorist organization suffers from the limitation imposed by the natural covert actions of the group. Since the majority of the group's activities are illegal, the availability of information is often incomplete and biased because of the protection the organization hopes to provide its operation, membership, and supporters. This need for self-protection tends to limit what is known about the organization not only to law enforcement agencies, but also to those who research for journalistic endeavors.

#### Procedure and Methodology Used in Study

Materials for this work were taken from an extensive review of literature available within the scope of this research. Publications reviewed covered the various fields that hold an interest in the study and control of terrorism: criminal justice, sociology, psychology, and political science. Additionally, journalistic accounts of Red Brigade and other related terrorist activities were reviewed and used to help form a more reliable, complete picture of the group as they existed and currently operate. Research was conducted only in publications printed in English, Italian, and German, and was limited to those available within this country.

Chronological placements and activity dating was accomplished by using the New York Times Index.<sup>7</sup> This source proved to be highly reliable in checking dated material and providing additional source material/information.

All references to radical and underground publications

are citations from previous works or reports, and the reader should bear this in mind. However, the value of these materials should not be discounted as secondhand. It became evident that in some cases citations were tainted by respective prejudice of the authors. Even in view of that fact, the combined materials provide a most comprehensive view of the Red Brigades.

#### Definition of Terms

1. Autonomia: "...is an ideology more than an organization. It means, literally, "autonomy", ie., the rejection of all the established values and forms of authority or social control—political parties, labor unions, schools, etc.—of the bourgeois society. Proletarian violence, according to autonomia, is the only effective response to the "institutionalized violence" of the system."<sup>8</sup>
2. Cells: Basic units of the terrorist organization, consisting of three to five members each. Each cell is capable of fully autonomous action.<sup>9</sup>
3. Columns: The largest compartment of the terrorist organizations structure. It is made-up of cells and may have as many as 1500 members. Columns are normally associated with the larger cities and enjoy operational autonomy.<sup>10</sup>
4. Leftist: Within Italian political thought, "an individual imbued with Marxist-Leninist thought".<sup>11</sup>

5. Neo-Fascist: An individual, or group, of the extreme right in political thought.<sup>12</sup>
6. Organization: A combination of more than one unit or group who have collected or banded together under one name for one or several expressed purposes. The Red Brigades are such a grouping.
7. Revolution: "...an uprising against government or authority".<sup>13</sup> Within this work, it is characterized by "armed struggle" and violence.
8. Terrorism: "...defined as a political act, ordinarily committed by an organized group, involving death or the threat of death to non-combatants."<sup>14</sup>

#### Organization of Remainder of Study

The thesis is organized in three chapters and an appendix. Chapter I contains the introduction, statement of problem, scope and limitations of the study, procedure and methodology of the study, and a list of definitions of terms. Chapter II contains a review of the pertinent literature, including books, journals, magazines, and newspaper articles/accounts. Chapter III contains a summarizing description of the Red Brigades with conclusions and recommendations drawn from this study.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Lotta Continua, 7 May 1975, quoted in Alessandro Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979), p. 95.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Selzer, Terrorist Chic (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1979).

<sup>3</sup>The term "sempre domani" in its slang translation means "always tomorrow", and confers an attitude of laxness.

<sup>4</sup>Alessandro Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979), p. xiii.

<sup>5</sup>Aldo Moro was a prominent leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Italy. He was abducted by the Red Brigades on 16 March 1978, tried by a "peoples court", then subsequently executed on 9 May 1978.

<sup>6</sup>US Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier was abducted by the Red Brigades on 17 Dec 1981. General Dozier was the senior US officer assigned to NATO in the southern region, headquartered in Verona, Italy. He was released after 42 days of captivity by a Italian police raid on a Red Brigade hide-out in the city of Padua, Italy.

<sup>7</sup>The New York Times Index is a bi-monthly publication that provides a comprehensive review of all articles published in the New York Times newspaper. Data given includes a short statement on the article as well as a date and page citation. At the end of each calendar year, the Index is republished in a yearbook volume.

<sup>8</sup>Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle, p. xvi.

<sup>9</sup>Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy", Conflict Studies 120 (July 1980): 10.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 2.



<sup>13</sup>Webster's College Dictionary, rev. ed. (1972), s.v. "Revolution".

<sup>14</sup>Jan Schreiber, The Ultimate Weapon: Terrorists and World Order (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1978), p. 20.

## Chapter II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The propaganda of the idea is a chimera...the education of the people is an absurdity. Ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, for the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are free. The only work a citizen can undertake for the good of the country is that of cooperating with material revolution; therefore, conspiracies, plots and attempts are that series of deeds by which Italy proceeds to her goal.

Carlo Pisacane<sup>1</sup>

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Italy. This century began with the assassination of King Umberto at the hands of an anarchist.<sup>2</sup> Mussolini himself escaped a number of attempts on his life before the fascist regime finally fell. Germanic descendents under Italian rule in the South Tyrol have periodically resorted to firearms in the hope of achieving unification with Austria, while Sardinian separatists have also on occasion employed violent tactics. In the late 60s and early 70s, political violence in Italy was associated primarily with fringe elements on the right: Neo-Fascists. But now, as the

80s open a new decade for Italy, so was an opening made for a new leading role in Italy's terrorist drama. During the mid-70s, the terrorists of the left began their campaigns, and armed bands began to issue communiques with the salutation "For Communism".

The Red Brigades (la Brigade Rosse - BR) did not grow as an effective terrorist organization solely because of a change from political right to left. Rather the roots of the BR are firmly grounded in a period where "psychological alientation" became the primary driving force behind the call for social, economic and political change.<sup>3</sup>

#### Consideration on the Background and Causes

Italy, like most western-European nations, moved into an "economic miracle" after the post-war reconstruction period of the late 1950s and early 1960s. This miracle was characterized by rapid technological progress, concentrated around the major cities in northern Italy: Turin; Milan; Brescia; Padua; Pordennone; Mestre; and Genoa. In a short survey of terrorist acts, whether from the Left or Right politically, these cities appear as focal points for many acts and as bases for many groups.

Along with the industrialization of the north came a corresponding migration from the south. The southern regions of Italy were, and still are to great extent, agarian. The populace in the south was generally poorer and less educated than their northern countrymen. The lure of the promises made

by industrialization caused many to abandon the farm and related agricultural positions, and move to the industry centers.

However, at the time Italy was building the industrial base, the government failed to simultaneously develop the parallel social and physical structures needed for this new generation of Italians. Consequently, the cities, on the receiving-end of the migration, were not equipped to absorb and to provide for this new population. Great shortages were experienced in respect to housing, schools, and hospitals.<sup>4</sup>

Vittorfranco Pisano in an article for Terrorism provides a view of terrorism in Italy, and in other industrialized societies, as a product of psychological alienation resulting from rapid technological progress not accompanied by development of the other society-supporting areas.<sup>5</sup> Without compensation by modern social institutions and infrastructures, many Italians caught between the changing conditions tried to return to the traditional values of the family and the Church. However, these values had also fallen into crisis. The family, as a strong unit, had lost most of its ability to provide personal support, because many were disjointed due to the migration to industrialization and economic opportunity. Such a loss is hard to recoup, if in fact ever possible. The Church, on the other hand, was coming under attack from areas not normally considered a threat. Large scale protests were staged against Church policies; mainly centered around policy on abortion and marriage. In any case, many supports that Italians had traditionally known were no longer available.

Paul Furlong takes the aberrations of Italian society, in the view of what is currently happening, as a reflection of local conditions; cultural, political, and in no-less-than Pisano's view, also economic and social.<sup>6</sup> His view centers on the political culture as it has developed and continues in Italy. Furlong sums up his view by stating,

Against the "redneck Marxism" of the left-wing terrorists and the grandiose operations of the neo-fascists, the Italian polity presents an ambiguous and polyvalent set of tactics, torn between its liberal—democratic constitution and origins and its authoritarian heavy-handed tradition. Political terrorism is implicitly an attack on the authority of the state, and may be closely connected with the development of the minority that believes itself to be permanently excluded from the political system; the questions that arise in the Italian case might therefore concern the authority of the Italian Republic and the economic, social and political conditions that have led to the emergence of a "permanent minority".<sup>7</sup>

No matter what view is taken, or what condition(s) is seen as the cause of Italian terrorism, the breeding-ground was laid early and came to maturity in the late 1960s. — The Italian "economic miracle" was coming to an end and the existing government had nothing to replace its loss.

As well as economic troubles, the loosely held together coalition government of Christian-Democrats (DC) and Italian Communist Party (PCI), was facing what might turn into an open civil war between the political left and Neo-Fascists of the far right. Between 1969 and 1974, the Italian Communist Party issued, on three occasions, a state of vigilance, calling on all its local units to stay alert and instructing its cadres to stand ready. The reasons for these announcements were to

be found in the overriding fear most PCI leaders had concerning a coup; a coup set about by the Neo-Facists in conjunction with the Italian Socialist Party (MSI). The Neo-Fascist movement was extremely strong during this period and succeeded in having some members elected to the Italian Parliament. From the far-right came the majority of violent activities of the late 1960's and may have been the cause for the emergence of the violent left in Italy.<sup>8</sup>

In the universities and factories, PCI organizers moved to gain ground to assure backing for their political organization. However, because of the economic and social conditions that were in trouble, the PCI soon found a more militant and aggressive audience than it could control. This period has become known as the "strategy of tension", and reflects the widening of opposition against the coalition government and the increasing clashes between left and right. The threat of a rightist-coup kept the Italian left alive and growing.

Alessandro Silj provides an excellent listing and discussion of factors that account for the birth of extreme left urban terrorists in Italy.<sup>9</sup> The factors include:

- the "strategy of tension" between left and right.
- disillusionment among young Communist militants with the new "social-democratic" line of the Communist party;
- the bitter disappointments that followed the great hopes raised by the 1967-68 student movement—radical students shared the belief that the bourgeois society was nearing its end and, when events proved otherwise, many students turned to more extreme forms of militancy;
- the end of the Italian "economic miracle" and the

unusually violent labor protest (strikes, demonstrations, and clashes with the police) in the fall of 1969 (the "hot autumn"), which led to a climate of tense, often violent social conflict—thus reinforcing the view that Italy's capitalist society was undergoing its most serious crisis ever and that armed struggle would make its collapse inevitable;

- the creation, in many northern factories, of the comitati autonomi, i.e., autonomous workers organizations, which fought the labor unions and called for more politicized, militant, and also more violent forms of struggle, such as boycotts, blocking deliveries and entrance into the plants by executive and clerical staff, sabotage, as well as other forms normally, but not always, opposed by the labor unions, e.g., refusal of overtime, work slow downs, absenteeism, work stoppages to protest working conditions;
- the general dissatisfaction, not only among leftist militants, with the results—or rather the nonresults—of the center-left government coalition (DC-PSI), which had failed to deliver most of the social reforms it had promised. This was seen as further evidence that revolution, as opposed to reformism, was the only strategy the working class should pursue.
- Finally, the birth of extreme left guerrillas was influenced also by some external factors, such as the Vietnam War and the fierce, highly ideological debate over the role and objectives of imperialist forces in the world. Last, but not least, the BR were undoubtedly influenced by the example of Latin American guerrillas, particularly the Tupamaros.

Silj seems to have best summed-up the formula for Italian terrorism when he said, "...thus, on the whole, it is fairly obvious that urban guerrillas in Italy are the product of a combination of indigenous political, economic, and social conditions.<sup>10</sup>

#### Feltrinelli and the GAP

Long before the Red Brigades came into being, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli had created his Gruppi di Azione Partigiana (GAP-

Partisan Action Group). The focus of GAP was not so much engaging in guerrilla actions but storing arms and food in their hideouts in the mountains; however, it was an attempted guerrilla action that eventually led to the fall of the group and the death of Feltrinelli.

Possibly, the most important aspect of the GAP was not in its being, but in the being of its mentor, Feltrinelli. He was much more than what most people believed a guerrilla could or would be. Giangiacomo Feltrinelli was for all accounts a padrone of Italy. He was a millionaire publisher with an aristocratic background. Although, his leftist views were openly expressed and he knowingly made many contacts with some of the world's better known guerrillas (Castro, Che Guevara, and Regis Debray)<sup>11</sup>, no one, either in the Italian government or police agencies, took him seriously as an iron revolutionary. However, an unexpected event, for both Feltrinelli and the rest of Italy, dramatically changed what was known about the man and the GAP.

On March 16, 1972, the morning Italian dailies reported the discovery of a burned and mutilated body beneath a high-tension pylon in Segrate, on the northern outskirts of Milan. The pylon, spattered with blood and torn flesh, was taped with forty-three sticks of dynamite. Another stick seemed to have blown-up in the man's hands, and the force of the explosion had flung one of his legs ten yards away.<sup>12</sup>

Twenty-four hours later, the dead man was identified: it was Giangiacomo Feltrinelli. The Atlantic, in an article



written four months later by Claire Sterling, reported the impact of Feltrinelli's death with the following,

Premier Giulio Andreotti and his Minister of Interior, the police, the carabinieri, the Army's counter-espionage service (SID) leaped into action. Roadblocks went up all across the North. Hundreds of raids were made on the homes and hideouts of right-wing and left-wing extremists in Milan, Turin, Genoa, Rome. Dozens of people were picked up for questioning. Seven thousand machine guns and other weapons, six tons of explosives, a million Molotov cocktails and other homemade bombs, sinister coded documents, and marked terrorist maps kept turning up in the police dragnet. For seven weeks running—until the elections, in fact—vigilant champions of democratic law and order saw to it that the case made frontpage headlines daily. Alive, Feltrinelli had done his obsessive best to destroy the Establishment he detested. In death, he could hardly have been more helpful.<sup>13</sup>

Sterling's article was careful to point-out that "there was not enough evidence to establish whether Feltrinelli accidentally touched off the explosion that killed him, or whether somebody else obligingly did it for him".<sup>14</sup> The Italian left used the incident to point to other quarters as the cause for Feltrinelli's death. The police, Fascists, and CIA were a few of the conspirators named by the Left as responsible. Camilla Cederna, a correspondent for the Italian newspaper L'Espresso, summed it up with the following,

What proof do I have? But what does it matter, in such a moment of extreme electoral tension? The proof will come along later?<sup>15</sup>

Feltrinelli's death created a new window from which a better view of Italian terrorism could be gained. His above-ground exploits were well known. His publishing empire had been long in favor of the Left and he, personally, had many leftist publications put in print. (Most notable among these

would be the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla by Carlos Marighella). Lesser known was his role(s) in terrorist activities. His role in the "Potere Operaio" (Workers' Power) was widely accepted.<sup>16</sup> However, a week after his death, the leaders of the "Potere Operaio" revealed that Feltrinelli wasn't really a part of their organization. They also cautioned belief in a "crackpot millionaire" theory. Their sentiments were, "...he was a "militant Communist" (meaning that he had long since left the PCI in disgust), who had founded the fearsome underground GAP, to whose needs he had adopted himself as skin-to-flesh".<sup>17</sup> From shortly after his death, the Italian public began to see what existed on the left of "Potere Operaio". There was a whole new political spectrum; in the more dramatic sense, a "cult of terror".<sup>18</sup>

The Atlantic article may have best described the GAP in the following passage,

Formed in September, 1970, to lead "an armed struggle against the bosses....and fascist pigs," GAP has recruited some five hundred followers by now. True to the promises broadcast over GAP's pirate radio, the organization is preparing for armed struggle all right. Its members, who are armed to the teeth, are kept in trim by a doctor comrade who prescribes a Spartan diet and long, brisk walks; they are trained in remote Apennine camps by German and South American military instructors using Carlos Marighella's Manual of Guerrilla Warfare. And they are committed to systematic terrorism: bombings and arson, kidnapping for money or political blackmail, killing for atonement or simply as instructive exercise.<sup>19</sup>

Those members of the GAP that were able to remain free after the numerous police arrests shortly after Feltrinelli's death, found refuge and immediate acceptance in a group that was still in its early stages—la Brigata Rosse. It is hard

to say how much terrorist intellect and learned skills were given to the BR by its newly gained members; however, to assume all prior training, contacts, and materials were left with the dead Feltrinelli's organization would be a grave error. As Possony points out in Terrorism, Feltrinelli, and certainly select members of his organization, had numerous contacts, nationally and international.<sup>20</sup> If, in fact as Possony speculates, Feltrinelli was the chief promoter of the BR, then his legacy might be even greater than previously thought.<sup>21</sup>

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"The destination matters little—socialism or anything else—or even the fate of the other travellers. The main thing is that it moves."

Debray<sup>22</sup>

International Contacts by Feltrinelli and GAP<sup>23</sup>

CONTACT	DATE	LOCATION
* Algerian activists	1957-60	Algeria: during the war, providing propaganda and money.
* Alexander N. Shelpin	1960-61	Leader of Komosomol (Communist Party of the USSR Youth Organ- ization): to align CPI youth and Komsomol.
* Fidel Castro	1964	In Cuba to secure publication rights to Castro's memoirs. Other actions were discussed and the Tricontinental Confer- ence was part of the itinerary. Also met with Che Guevara.
* "	1965-69	Continued the above relation- ship.
* "	July 67	Attended and reported on the Congress of Tricontinental Solidarity.
* Rudi Dutschke & Andreas Baader	1968	In West Germany: Discussed the beginnings of the RAF.
* Ulrike Meinhoff	1968-72	In Italy at Feltrinelli's home. Discussion on the continuing struggles within Europe. These meetings may have paved the way for what would become the strong relationship between the BR and the RAF. Petra Krause also attended many of these meetings.
* Régis Debray	1968	In a Bolivian prison. Feltri- nelli went there to find the true story of Che Guevara. Trips like this reinforced the ideology and the hero- worship that became his pas- sion.
* George Habash	1968-71	In Italy, Switzerland, & the FRG. These meetings were for the PLF, but also established the link for European terrorists and their Mid-east comrades

### The Red Brigades: Early Development

Daniel Cohn-Bendit provided an insight, as seen from within the Left, into the development of a terrorist group when he stated,

These guerrilla groups—the RAF and the Brigade Rosse—don't just happen. They are produced in a certain kind of society, where there is a hopeless situation. They do not come because of brutal repression, but out of crushed expectations.<sup>24</sup>

As to whether the situation in Italy ever reached a level of "hopelessness" is debateable, and depends very much on where the observer was in society. In the late 1960s, many people in Italy, mostly students and workers, were in a position where the state of the government, economy, and society appeared quite hopeless. In this period were born the sentiments and personal commitments that lead to the formation of the Red Brigades.

The "historic nucleus", or founding fathers, of the BR came from a wide variety of backgrounds, regions, and occupations. The majority came from the universities or extraparlimentary parties and groups of the Left. Each founder brought a sincere belief that "Italy, its workers (the Proletariat) were being exploited by the imperialist state of the multinationals".<sup>25</sup>

In placing the blame for allowing the exploitation of Italy, Pisano states that the BR is not highly discriminatory in who is to blame. In a statement in Conflict Studies, Pisano describes the BR's belief in the Christian Democratic Party

as the "foremost representative", but also calls the FCI as a "collaborator" in the exploitation. Likewise, the MSI is considered a direct enemy of the revolution.<sup>26</sup>

Not only does the BR look to the internal workings of the Italian state as an exploiter of the people, it has developed an international perspective. In the BR analysis of the international situation, they point to "reactionary exploitation as being the objective and practice of the United States of America and of the Federal Republic of Germany. Within Italy, they see the presence of the "American Party".<sup>27</sup>

In looking at the current life history of the BR it is possible to divide it into four principal phases. The early development, or beginnings, would constitute phase one. As Pisano points out, the phase lasted from 1969 through 1972 and was essentially confined to the city of Milan.<sup>28</sup> During this period came the training for the "historic nucleus", where the newly forming BR was to gain the knowledge and capabilities to progress and survive.

Operations during this first phase were limited and characterized what was the beginnings of a highly efficient clandestine group. The group concentrated on distribution of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary propaganda in the factories and in carrying-out relatively light damage raids, using fire bombs. The targets were normally automobiles and other private property, belonging to industrial executives, political conservatives of all parties, and rightist activists.<sup>29</sup>

This early period was one built for feeling-out and

constructing an uderground organization. For many of the members, operating underground was totally new and living within the rigid requirements of clandestine operations strenuous. However, the success and continued operation of the BR today attest to the total committment given by each member.

Silj explains what he believes were the reasons for moving underground and, also why the members were able to adapt to that new environment so quickly. He states,

The climate of the autumn of 1969 was altogether different: the elements that prevailed were worker struggles, the repressive action on the part of the polical power, and the rightist's strategy of tension perceived as a prelude to the rightist coup d'etat. It was in this climate that the choices ultimately made by Curcio and his comrades ripened. The growth in 1968 and 1969 of the worker autonomy group also played a determining role. According to Curcio and his comrades it is this proletarian vanguard that, in a pre-revolutionary phase, can avail itself of an "armed hand": an armed hand that, in existing conditions, cannot yet seek an open clash but can pave the way for it and accelerate it by recourse to clandestine actions.

With the "autonomia" strongly entrenched in Milan prior to the BR's movement underground, it was to the BR's best interest to form a strong liaison with them. In later years, police raids would uncover caches of arms and ammunition that would actually be part of "autonomia", but would be immediately labelled as BR.<sup>31</sup> As the BR grew, the "autonomia" closely kept the liaison, and provided new recruits. The "autonomia" had its vanguard, and the vanguard had a powerful platform from which to draw support.<sup>32</sup>

It was during this period that the BR and Feltrinelli made their initial contact. Although, Renato Curcio (labelled

as the "founding father" of the BR) and his other comrades regarded Feltrinelli as a romantic and old-fashioned, and they differed with him on a number of ideological and strategic issues, they nonetheless kept the liaison and drew as much as possible from him and his organization.<sup>33</sup> Feltrinelli's money and connections were to become very useful to the BR in later years.

To summarize, the first phase was a period of growth, trial and evaluation, and formation for the BR. Violence was kept to a minimum, but organizational goals were met by surviving the initial tests of going underground. The political right was still responsible for the majority of terrorist acts and use of violence; however, the left now had the beginnings of its vanguard.

#### The Red Brigades: Second Phase

The second phase of BR operations can be characterized by one word, expansion. The group, having established itself in Milan, began to move to other cities within the industrial triangle. The point of the triangle are the cities of Milan, Genoa, and Turin.<sup>34</sup> Of import also to the BR selection of areas for expansion was the area of PCI control: the "red-belt" of Italy.

Not so consequently, however, is the correlation between the PCI area and the industrial region. Geographically and politically they are one in the same. If an arc were drawn from the northern point of the industrial region, curving



south to both west and east coastlines, stopping just north of Rome and south of Venice, respectively, the region covered by the arc, widened to 200 miles, would be the "red belt" of Italy. Within this region approximately 80 percent of the population subscribes to the PCI party line. Also, the "worker's party" were highly active; "everyone that works in the factories, knows what the Left will do the help them".<sup>35</sup>

Besides moving into a new area geographically, the BR updated its tactics to benefit what the leaders saw as a new campaign. Tactics changed from sporadic encounters with the opposition to systematic operations. During the period March 1972 - April 1974, BR members conducted six kidnappings of major public officials and corporate executives. It was during this period, that the BR perfected what has become an uncanny ability to almost flawlessly conduct political kidnappings.<sup>36</sup>

Another area of naturing, that took place during this phase, was what Pisano labelled as the "ability to exploit the attendant media coverage".<sup>37</sup> Cooper in his perspective essay, Terrorism and the Media, set the stage for answering the import of the media to the terrorist. He said,

By its very nature, a terrorist act is meant to be impressive. It is calculated to be an attention-getting activity. The watchers are those whom the terrorist wishes to impress;....(The) basic theory of terrorism is strikingly akin to that of general deterrence. Both require the aid of extensive publicity to reach their ulterior targets. While the role of the media is clearly, in the one case, legitimate by association, it is the association itself which is called in question when the media is used by the terrorist to attain his objective.<sup>38</sup>

By developing their capabilities as propagandists, the

BR leadership was able to fulfill another square in meeting all the requirements set down by Carlos Marighella in the Mini-Manual.<sup>39</sup> Marighella wrote,

The coordination of urban guerrilla actions, including each armed action, is the principal way of making armed propaganda.

The result of armed propaganda is that the more daring and gruesome the terrorism act is, the greater the publicity.<sup>40</sup>

To further enhance the capability to spread propaganda, the BR attached itself to the ultra-leftist publication Controinformazione.<sup>41</sup> With the rights of a free-press guaranteed by the Italian state, the BR was given an ideal propaganda outlet and, also, a position that was no longer in the underground. According to Sterling, Controinformazione was so quickly accepted into the organization that it became the "house organ" and spoke, without restraint, on BR affairs.<sup>42</sup>

For all intent and purposes, the second phase solidified the BR and gave it the systematic and rigid structure it needed to continue its role of vanguard. The BR had reached a status where the Italian state could no longer point to them as a loose collection of criminals and fanatics. The BR had become a "terrorist organization" and was ready to move into a new phase of operations.

#### The Red Brigades: Third Phase

This period in BR operations covers from September 1974 through January 1976 and begins a period of internal change.<sup>43</sup> During this time, the "historic nucleus" began to decline and

a "second generation" of brigadist began to emerge.<sup>44</sup>

The decline of the "historic nucleus" was caused by two totally unrelated circumstances; however, the impact of one upon the other helped to hasten the decline of the older members and accelerate the incoming of the "second generation".

The first threat to the older members of the group came from the outside, and amounted to the simple fact of attrition to the state police forces. As Pisano points out, "resounding law enforcement successes" were the order-of-the-day.<sup>45</sup> The majority of the police success was centered around the capture of many of the "historic nucleus"; one in particular was Renato Curcio. With Curcio's capture and other setbacks, there was speculation that the days of the BR were numbered.<sup>46</sup> However, the effect of state successes was not to stop the BR, but only to cleanout the old heirarchy and make way for a newer, more dynamic leadership.

The second circumstance that led to a change of leadership was one that had grown internal to the organization. There was for the first time a period of dissension in the ranks. As Silj states, "...there had been a birth of a "new" student movement, not so caught-up with ideology; but more atuned to act".<sup>47</sup> As these students became members of the BR, they brought with them the position that "amounted to a flat rejection of the system as a whole".<sup>48</sup> Their total pessimism is reflected in the graffiti found on the walls of Rome University, — "When even shit becomes marketable, then the poor will be born without an ass".<sup>49</sup>

The "second generation" brought with them skills that those of the "historic nucleus" did not have, or at least, did not use. The acts became more deliberate, but less intellectual. Pesano uses the incident of 15 May 1975 as an indicator of acts to come. He states,

...(another) BR commando group erupted into the Milan law offices of DC councilman (later member of Parliament) Massimo de Carolis, "tried" him, and shot him in the leg. Although this operation was skillfully organized from an operational standpoint (seven persons present in the office had to be immobilized), it was an initial clue as to the deteriorating intellectual caliber of the "new generation" of brigadists that was beginning to emerge during this phase. The shallow level of questioning to which de Carolis was subjected is indicative of the lesser theoretical preparation of the group. The leg shooting was also to become the trademark of the "new generation" of the BR.<sup>50</sup>

Another indication that the BR was not about to die was the 15 February 1975 commando raid that freed Renato Curcio and other BR members. The raid was led by Curcio's wife, Margherita "Mara" Cagol.<sup>51</sup> On 4 June 1975, Mara was killed in a shoot-out with Carabinieri. With the death of Mara and the other arrests of BR members, the neutralization of the "historic nucleus" was well underway with little chance of recovery.<sup>52</sup>

The rearrest of Curcio on 9 January 1976 was the final act of this phase. However, the BR, even suffering numerous setbacks, continued to grow and to stage operations for the revolution of the proletariat.

### The Red Brigades: Fourth Phase

The fourth and current phase of BR operations is characterized by deliberate violence, and as Pisano states, "... is indeed the bloodist".<sup>53</sup> The escalation of violence can be attributed to the dominance of the "second generation" brigadist, and their belief in action against the state.<sup>54</sup>

During this phase, the BR became more than a group striking at political adversaries or the structures of a capitalist system. The change took place on 8 June 1976, when a BR commando unit consisting of two teams shot down Genoa's Attorney General Francesco Coco and his two escorts.<sup>55</sup> This action indicated a change in targets and also from the level of demonstrative violence to lethal actions.

Pisano points to the Coco killing as having significant meaning in two ways. First, it proved that the BR would operate on the principle of "retaliation".<sup>56</sup> The retaliatory aspect is drawn from Coco's involvement in the BR-Sossi affair. Genoa's Assistant attorney General Mario Sossi was kidnapped by the BR on 18 April 1974 and held for 35 days. (This was an unprecedented period of captivity for Italian terrorists). Coco's involvement was his actions to stop the granting of BR demands for Sossi's release. This role, although limited, placed Coco in the limelight as an "anti-terror" figure.<sup>57</sup> Secondly, the Coco affair enhanced the BR image as true terrorists by building an even larger "intimidatory aspect" to their operations.<sup>58</sup> Intimidation was to become very important to the BR and also

become part of every operation.

By using the Coco murder and also threatening the lay jurors assigned to the ongoing Turin trial, the BR was able to postpone the proceedings. Defendants in this trial included Renato Curcio and other members of the "historic nucleus". (Because of BR intimidation, the trial was not completed until approximately two years later; 24 June 1978).<sup>59</sup>

Intimidation and retaliation took a new form when the BR began a program of highly dramatized shootings that soon became known as "knee-cappings". For a period, January-December 1977, "knee-cappings" took on the appearance of an almost every-day occurrence.<sup>60</sup>

However, prominent BR actions were, or how dramatic their operations, there were two acts that were to later catch the attention of the world. The first occurred on 16 March 1978, and Pisano recounts the act as follows,

"... (In Rome), when Aldo Moro, former premier and incumbent Christian Democratic party president, was abducted on his way to Parliament to participate in the vote of confidence for the new cabinet. In the attack all five members of his police escort were murdered in a matter of seconds. This urban guerrilla operation was conducted with such precision and attention to detail that even the telephone lines in the immediate vicinity were sabotaged in advance to facilitate the operation. Moreover, all four tires of a florist's pickup truck—usually parked during the daytime by the Via Fani intersection where the abduction took place—were slashed in the course of the night near the owner's home in another area of the city in order to eliminate this encumbrance from the projected sight of the abduction."<sup>61</sup>

Moro was held in a "people's prison" for 54 days, before he was finally executed on 9 May 1978. His execution followed

the Italian government's refusal to release thirteen terrorists.<sup>62</sup> (One of those to be released was Curcio).

Even during the period that Moro was being held and the ensuing heavy police dragnet, the BR was able to mount a series of complementary operations, including two murders and six knee-cappings.<sup>63</sup> These simultaneous operations clearly showed that the BR had the capability to act with precision and on a wide-front, even under heavy state police pressures.

The second act was to be the BR's first venture into the international arena. On 17 December 1981, the BR using a four-man team posing as plumbers, kidnapped US Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration.<sup>64</sup> General Dozier was the highest-ranking American Army officer at NATO's Southern Europe Land Forces Headquarters in Verona, Italy.<sup>65</sup>

The Dozier abduction brought about considerable speculation on the intent of the BR. On one side, as expressed by a US official, "... that his abduction was a "symbolic" act: "He's American, he's a general, he's part of NATO".<sup>66</sup> On the other more dire extreme, the press speculated that one possible demand for Dozier's release would be, "... scrapping a plan to install 112 nuclear-tipped American cruise missiles in southern Sicily in 1983".<sup>67</sup> Although, neither intent would be totally clear, the latter was in all probability more correct. On 28 January 1982, Italian anti-terrorist forces stormed an apartment hide-out in Padua, Italy, and rescued Dozier.<sup>68</sup> Dozier spent 42 days in the hands of the BR and was interrogated, tried, and

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sentenced by a "people's court". However, as the BR was to admit later, the Dozier rescue was a "... victory for the imperialist bourgeoisie", and "... the mistakes made will not be repeated".<sup>69</sup>

What the fourth phase has shown is that the BR has the strength and organization to conduct operations even when the Italian state has massed its best in an effort to destroy the group. Although the BR has survived, and from all indications the violence will continue, the group has not as yet succeeded in destroying the Italian state. As Leonardo Sciascia commented:

The central error of the Red Brigade consists precisely in believing that they can succeed in striking at the heart of the State. The heart of the Italian State does not exist. Neither, any longer, does its brain. And it is that which paradoxically is its strength or at least its capacity to resist.<sup>70</sup>

#### The Red Brigades: Organizational Structure

One of the keys to understanding any organization is to study its structure, and in this respect the terrorist organization is no exception. Wolf, using the management and organizational principles espoused by Peter F. Drucker and William H. Newman, set down a basic answer to the organization and management plan of a terrorist group. He stated,

A terrorist organization, existing for a specific purpose and mission, is a social unit (human grouping) deliberately constructed and managed to achieve rational cooperation as it pursues specific goals. Consequently, ideological commitment by members of a terrorist group to the goals of their organization is a prerequisite to organizational survival. For this purpose, results to be achieved by terrorist propaganda and armed actions are expressed in terms of goals. Used in this broad sense, goals of a terrorist organization would include

such things as objectives, purposes, missions, deadlines, targets, and quotas. Goals, therefore, are a vital link in the administration of a terrorist organization as they aid in decentralization, provide a basis for voluntary coordination, become a focus for individual motivation, and also serve as essential elements in the process of control.<sup>71</sup>

The BR, differing only in its clandestine environment, is like any other organization in that it had to devise its structure to best accomplish the mission. According to Pisano, the BR structure is now known due to the information taken from police raids on "operational bases", statements made by captured brigadists, and other anonymous informers.<sup>72</sup> Apparently, the organization of the BR follows "a pyramidal structure with closed compartments, each headed by a person who acts as a filter and insures access to the higher compartment".<sup>73</sup>

Accordingly, Furlong states that, "... (BR) have an articulated organization with established groups—'columns'— of full-time clandestine terrorists in at least four major cities and probably elsewhere".<sup>74</sup> In fact, there are five columns: Milan; Turin; Genoa; Rome; and Naples.<sup>75</sup> The term column is derived from the designation used for the fifth column sabotage units that operated during the Spanish Civil War, and as Wolf states, "was also used as a name for the major subdivisions of Fidel Castro's Cuban guerrilla army, each of which was assigned to conduct operations in a specific geographical area".<sup>76</sup> Wolf also identifies the Tupamaros as having used the columnar style of organization with accompanying numerical identifiers.<sup>77</sup>

From testimony given by Cristoforo Piancone, a brigadist turned state informer, each column consists of 1,500 members

and has full operational autonomy from the other columns.<sup>78</sup> The need for autonomy is essential to the preservation of the clandestine environment.

Because of the unusually large BR columns, they are incapable of performing as an entity. To solve this operational problem, each column has been divided into "cells". Wolf states,

... (Cells) are formed by terrorists for the purpose of assigning specific units to perform certain tasks and thereby overcoming the inherent weakness that usually is associated with a popularly based movement or party—the lack of specialization.<sup>79</sup>

Each BR cell consists of three to five members, each well trained for the specific duties of that cell.<sup>80</sup> For example, should the members be technically skilled, they may be trained and then employed in the manufacture of counterfeit documents. Other cells may be assigned tasks from logistics to actual commando operations. No matter what the tasking, each assignment directly ties to the overall functioning of the column as directed by the "Direzione Strategica" (Strategic Control).<sup>81</sup>

The Strategic Control<sup>82</sup>, due to the isolation of clandestine operations, may have experienced problems. Furlong believes that the Strategic Control has experienced problems in "keeping the operations of the individual columns under central directions".<sup>83</sup>

The problem of command and control of any large organization is always present; however, in the case of a terrorist group, which wishes to maintain secrecy at all levels, the problem becomes aggravated.

### The Red Brigades: Ideology

Webster's New World Dictionary defines ideology as "the doctrines, opinions of an individual, class, etc.". <sup>84</sup>

Normally associated with any ideology is a level of dogma that impresses all that encounter the individual possessing it. However, within the BR the careful attention to ideological dogmatism is not rigidly placed, nor is it a stringent requirement to hold the group together. Sterling makes a point of this lack of careful articulation by stating,

"... they have scarcely hinted at the kind of communism they are after. They may not even know, and don't appear to care. Nowhere in their voluminous ideological tracts does the subject get more than a negligent and in passing. In sixty pages of their famous Resolution on Strategic Direction, the Red Brigades devoted four lines to the question." <sup>85</sup>

Although, they lack the defined level of communism, the BR certainly do not lack the rhetoric common to the Marxist-Leninist view. Butas Pisano is careful to point-out, the BR rhetoric is "generally couched in Stalinist terms". <sup>86</sup> To illustrate the point, he uses a widely published claim by the BR that "the counterrevolution is not generated by them, but by the state itself, since counterrevolution is the substance of the state". <sup>87</sup>

To present a stronger, and the tones used by the Stalinist legions, the BR expand on the above by adding the "armed struggle" to assist in the accomplishment of the counterrevolution. In what has been labelled as the "manifest objective" of the BR, they clearly state their Stalinist role by acting "to mobi-

lize, to extend and to deepen the armed initiative against the political, economic, and military centers of the imperialist state of the multinationals".<sup>88</sup>

The ideology of the BR does not limit itself to Italy, or for that matter solely to Europe. Pisano states that "... the BR frequently express their solidarity with "proletarian internationalism".<sup>89</sup> Sterling continues this BR view on international cooperation by,

... (BR), who like to think that they speak for many or most of their kind, have made it plain that theirs is a war for the destruction of Western democracy. They have even published a terror timetable.

In their Resolution on Strategic Direction of 1978, Italy and West Germany were singled-out respectively as "the weakest and strongest links in the Western democratic chain" and thus as the front-line states. Circumstances permitting—the governments and peoples under siege permitting, that is—the next stage was supposed to be the formation of a Continent-wide "Organization of Communist Combat", striking at the West's "vital centers of multi-national imperialism". Then would come the final storming of the imperialist heights: the United States, forever in the gunsights of the worldwide revolutionary left, supreme target in the "long and terrible war" that Ernesto "Che" Guevara once urged upon his followers.<sup>90</sup>

Until the Resolution of Strategic Direction in 1978, the BR ideology had no true scope and although brought into actions and deeds on many occasions, lacked the defined channel of the Resolution. With this new document, the BR had a true design that all members could see and eventually gauge themselves. Both the Moro and Dozier affairs were proclaimed in the Resolution, not by name, but by indication of the targets and approximately when the act would occur.<sup>91</sup>

In any analysis, ideology can be said to be the "impulse"

for the BR membership to act as "vanguard" for the proletariat. And to ensure the constant impulse of motivation, a shift in ideology (maybe slight, maybe major) might be required. Whatever the requirement, it is a certainty the BR will adjust to it to maintain the momentum of the revolution.

Walter Laqueur may have best put ideology in its place in respect to the terrorist when he said,

... terrorism is not an ideology but an insurrectional strategy that can be used by people of very different political convictions... (It) is not merely a technique... its philosophy transcend(s) the traditional dividing lines between political doctrine. It is truly all-purpose and value-free.<sup>92</sup>

#### The Red Brigades: Tactics

As with any military or paramilitary organizations, the BR uses tactics to reach a desired outcome. The plan of battle can be composed of non-violent acts, violent acts, or any combination of the two. It can be staged in any area, any time, any weather, and in some ways the most important, against anybody. The knowledge of being a possible target is by far the most fearsome attribute a terrorist group has; as long as they commit enough acts to lend credence to the possibility.

The BR have over their twelve years of operations exhibited a wide variety of tactics to support the goals of the group. Variations of each tactic are numerous and can't easily be covered; however, there are, in this author's opinion, five areas of tactical operation that are worth discussion. They are: propaganda; property destruction; demonstrative acts

against persons; knee-cappings"; and assassination. The five latter areas contribute to the first area as each has a certain amount of propaganda value and can be exploited to achieve the maximum in that area.

### Propaganda

The key to effective propaganda is more or less simply, wide-spread dissemination. The value of any terrorist act is only as good as the publicity it receives. For example, a kidnapping that receives little press coverage will probably have little effect on the general population, and certainly cause little alarm in others of the target group.

During the second phase of BR operations, the membership learned "how to exploit the attendant news media".<sup>93</sup> The BR procedure called for an after-the-fact technique by claiming responsibility by "means of a leaflet and/or a telephone call, usually directed to a newspaper or a news agency".<sup>94</sup> Possibly, the most popular was ANSA, the Italian National News Service. ANSAs dependability and nation/world-wide ability to report the act were perfect for the BR campaigns.

Outside of large coverage news agencies, the BR has a favored leftist publication, Controinformazione. During the early 70s, the BR adopted the paper as its "house organ".<sup>95</sup> Since that time, Controinformazione has served the BR very well, reporting activities, group articles, group rhetoric, and providing a legal opening to the aboveground.

The value of propaganda has been known in all wars, hot

or cold; however, the value to the urban guerrilla normally far exceeds the worth extracted by legitimate governments. Silj speaks of a "humus where the seeds of violence best take root".<sup>96</sup> To the terrorist, good propaganda is the irrigation of that humus. The ER have become known around the world, and much of that notoriety is simply due to good publicity.

### Property Destruction

In the early period of BR development acts against the state, political parties, and individuals were normally directed at the property of those targets. The firebombing of an executive's car, or the "trashing" of an office were common, and became trademarks of the young group.<sup>97</sup>

Although the BR has not completely abandoned this tactic, it by itself is rarely used by a somewhat more technologically sophisticated BR. Group leaders realized that the sheer destruction of property, unless conducted on a grand scale, was of very little value, and in some cases detrimental to the cause. To destroy a large section of a factory may actually cause undue hardship on some of the group's sympathizers.<sup>98</sup>

Current operations normally call for the destruction of property on a "time permitting" basis. During any operation, if the operation leader feels that the addition of the property destruction will not hinder the success of the act, or might in fact be of added value, then addition of the act will occur.<sup>99</sup>

By adding the areas of (f), (h), and (j) under Appendix C, the total number of acts committed that involve property



damage are over 50 percent of all BR operations. However, their individual significance has waned over the years, as they have been replaced by a higher-order of terror provoking acts.

#### Demonstrative Acts Against Persons

These acts are normally on the lower end of the spectrum of violence, and in some cases, represent what might be called a "sense of terrorist humor". For example, on 24 May 1979, a BR commando unit chained Christian-Democratic councilwoman Rossella Sborghi to the staircase of her apartment-building in Genoa, poured a can of glue on her head, hung a BR poster around her neck, then photographed her.<sup>100</sup>

At a higher level of sophistication is the act of kidnapping, and as can be seen by the wide coverage given the BR, they have been highly successful in this area. As of 1 July 1982, the BR has successfully accomplished 20 kidnappings and have not limited themselves to state officials.<sup>101</sup> Unlike other acts, the kidnapping always possesses a degree of variation that is not available in any other operation. The Moro kidnapping is an excellent example of the variety of returns the BR can draw from a kidnapping operation. It provided unparalleled level of propaganda; state confusion; public outcry; and lastly, a demonstration of BR capability.<sup>102</sup>

#### "Knee-cappings"

Although, this technique may not truly fit the role of

a tactic, it has so caught the eye of the media that its value should not be understated. The BR were the first to initiate the public to this technique of demonstrative action, but other groups were soon to adopt the idea.<sup>103</sup>

Since the act of "knee-capping" appeared as a new method of terrorists, the publicity generated by its occurrence was so large, that the propaganda value was more appreciable than the act. The BR have found the technique to be of value at least 49 times, and from all indications will continue in its use.<sup>104</sup>

#### Assassination

As the ultimate act of terrorism, the BR have used assassination on 39 occasions and have been successful in all attempts.<sup>105</sup> The Moro assassination represented a change in targeting for BR assassins. Normally the targets were in intermediary cadre of the Christian-Democratic Party, police officials, academics, and a few industrial executives. Moro, on the other hand, was not just part of the ranks, he was at the head.

The majority of assassinations have been of the hit and run variety which corresponds to one of the BR's teachings of Che Guevara who used the expression of "Bite and flee".<sup>106</sup> Moro was again the exception, being held 54 days prior to his assassination.

There is little doubt that future BR assassinations will continue against those they feel represent a level of opposition

which can not be suppressed in any other manner.

### The Red Brigades: International Ties

The question of international cooperation between terrorist groups has been tossed around for quite some time; however, many people in important places have taken a naive approach to the many facts placed before them. Sterling points out that she was once asked by President Carter's advisor on terrorism in the National Security Council, "You don't really believe this bunk about international terrorism, do you?" Her reply was a short, "Yes, I do."<sup>107</sup>

The BR have made no effort to cover their view on the need for international cooperation in the revolutionary effort. In February 1978, when the BR issued its Resolution on Strategic Direction part of the contents espoused the following sentiments,

... the necessity to develop to the fullest extent historically possible operational co-operation, reciprocal support, and solidarity with the elements that constitute proletarian internationalism.<sup>108</sup>

Within the Resolution, the BR openly names other groups such as; the German Red Army Faction, the French Armed Nucleus for Popular Autonomy, and the "autonomous movements possessing a Socialist nature".<sup>109</sup> The last section is a reference that allows the inclusion of the Irish Republican Army and the Basque ETA.

The connections brought to the BR organization by members of Feltrinelli's GAP were many and world-wide.<sup>110</sup> These were, if anything, just additional inputs for the organization.

The BR had already made some outside contacts. Pisano reports, "that between 1970 and 1972 Andreas Baader visited Italy twice to discuss the anti-imperialist struggle".<sup>111</sup> Baader's intent was not only discussion but also to instruct; he advised the BR not to limit their sphere of action to the factories and industrial executives, but to carry the attack to the political structures of the State.<sup>112</sup> Evidently, he was able to persuade the change, because within the year the BR did move against the State.<sup>113</sup>

The connection with German terrorists continued in the following years, with many known terrorists hiding-out in Italy. However, the connection at a level above general discussion and instruction was reported by Time in August 1978. Time asked a question that seemed to have strong evidence to assert an affirmative reply: "Did the Red Brigades have help in Moro's kidnapping?"<sup>114</sup> The Time article presented what Italian officials found and believed to be evidence of links between the BR and the Red Army Faction. This evidence was strong enough for "... Italian authorities to believe that the accumulated clues indicate the direct participation or at least the active support of German organizations in the Moro affair".<sup>115</sup>

Although, the Germans appear to be the closest ally of the BR, they are by no means the only. According to Pisano, additional connections can be proved with other organizations.<sup>116</sup> For example: logistical and training arrangements with elements of the IRA;<sup>117</sup> participation in meetings in Yugoslavia by a BR representative with European, Latin American, and Palestinian

elements to discuss "the international strategy and planning of the revolution";<sup>118</sup> support for a Rome based Argentine Montonero group;<sup>119</sup> logistical connections to French terrorists;<sup>120</sup> BR members trained in Lebanon;<sup>121</sup> training by Cuban military;<sup>122</sup> liaison with the Chilean resistance movement;<sup>123</sup> training centers in Czechoslovakia;<sup>124</sup> and noted contacts with KGB operatives within Italy.<sup>125</sup>

The biggest break for those, who over the past 12 years have worked to clearly establish that the connections are more than just communications and training, may have come with the raid on the apartment where General Dozier was being held. During that raid, Antonio Savasta, the leader of the unit that abducted Dozier, turned state's evidence.<sup>126</sup> According to Time, Savasta confirmed,

... reports that the Red Brigades had developed ties to other terrorist groups, including the Palestine Liberation Organization and West Germany's Red Army Faction. He also provided a fascinating, if as yet inconclusive, link between the Red Brigades and the Soviet bloc.<sup>127</sup>

With Savasta being cooperative and evidently willing to possibly disclose all the "inner secrets" of the BR, some light may be shed on the question of a "transnational terrorist network". Supposition may finally give way to suppose. Sterling may have provided a small map of the network when she wrote,

I went to Vienna, and from there to Zurich, and on to Bonn and half a dozen other European capitals, pursuing a trail that led far beyond Italian and German frontiers. The trail grew more and more familiar as I went along, tracking back first on Gabriele and then on her ex-husband, Norbert. Feltrinelli and Curiel crossed it, as well as Carlos and his Palestinian sponsors. So did the Tupamaros and the IRA Provisionals, the Red

Brigades, the Polisario Front in the western Sahara, and terrorists from at least eight other nations. The Cubans and Russians came and went. Nothing I found along the way pointed to a single master plan. Certain people simply happened to show up in the right place at the right time, again and again.<sup>128</sup>

### The Red Brigades: The Moro Affair

On 16 March 1978, the Red Brigades successfully carried out an operation that was possibly the most daring of their organizational career, and also the most far-reaching of any European terrorist endeavor. At 9:00 a.m., Rome time, a BR commando team of 12 members shot and killed five police bodyguards, grabbed Aldo Moro and escaped into city traffic.<sup>129</sup> The attack was no different than other BR operations; deadly precise and well coordinated. But there was a major difference; the target—Aldo Moro. Aldo Moro, 61, was the Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Party and a five-time past Italian Premier.<sup>130</sup> Past BR operations had been limited to lower officers, industry executives, academics, and law enforcement officials.<sup>131</sup> Moro's abduction provided the desired effect of terrorism, and Time reported it as follows,

... (In) a country almost inured to brazen violence, the abduction of so lofty a public official sent Italy reeling in shock. The government quickly launched the biggest man hunt in postwar history.<sup>132</sup>

The Moro abduction came at a time when Italy was "on the verge of a dramatic political breakthrough".<sup>133</sup> That "breakthrough" was the entry of the PCI into the parliamentary majority. Aldo Moro had played a significant role in engineering a coalition involving the PCI and DC which would hold the

existing government together. With the coalition, the DC would be able to hold the highest office even in minority position.<sup>134</sup> As Pisano asserts, the timing of the abduction was set as "the symbolism was clear since Moro was Communist Secretary - General Berlinguer's primary counterpart in the "historic compromise" politics of the two parties".<sup>135</sup>

Although the act is widely accepted as symbolic, the actual point of the symbolism is not fully clear. As stated above, Pisano felt the coalition was the ultimate target. Pallotta, in writing his view of the act, placed the target at a much higher level.<sup>136</sup> Throughout the first section of his book, Pallotta asks, "Why Moro?". His final answer comes from a portion of BR ideology, where they state, "the attack must be pressed to the "center of the state" and of such proportion to gain the eyes of all those who oppose the revolution".<sup>137</sup> Pallotta believes that "Aldo Moro was that "center" and that he, more than anyone or anything else, represented the Italian state".<sup>138</sup>

Throughout the 54 days of captivity, the BR had set only one demand for Moro's release and that was simply stated: "release of 13 colleagues in prison". One of the 13 was Renato Curcio, founding father of the BR.<sup>139</sup> All in all, there were nine communiques from the BR, each containing rhetoric concerning the interrogation and "people's trial" of Moro.<sup>140</sup> Along with the communiques came several photographs of Moro and also three handwritten letters. The letters were addressed to political friends and his wife, and seemed to show the stress

Moro was under. In each, Moro stressed the need for "realism in dealing with the BR" and that "the only possible positive solution was the liberation of prisoners on both sides".<sup>141</sup> In his last letter, Moro stated, "... time is running out fast. In truth, I feel somewhat abandoned by all of you".<sup>142</sup>

In the BR's ninth and last communique, Moro's death sentence was restated, and "that they were carrying out the sentence of the people's trial".<sup>143</sup> Five days later, on 9 May 1978, Aldo Moro was executed. He died by eleven shots fired from a Czech-made Skorpion 7.65mm pistol and unidentified 9.-cal. handgun.<sup>144</sup>

The death of Aldo Moro did little to change Italy or the political, economic, and social status quo. Italy fell into mourning, but mourned only as long as any country can afford to.<sup>145</sup> Time may have best summed-up the Moro ordeal by the following final paragraph on his death,

(Alienation) That lesson may give the brigatisti themselves pause. After hailing the execution of Moro as an act of "revolutionary justice", Renato Curcio, now on trial in Turin for armed insurrection, shouted to those assembled in the crowded courtroom last week: "Perhaps you have not understood what has happened in these days or what will happen in the coming months for Italy!" In fact, everyone understood only too well. In murdering a man dedicated to the principle that people who differ could find common cause, Moro's assassins had neither divided nor conquered but united the nation in a new determination to preserve that vision.<sup>146</sup>

The BR had clearly failed in this bid to crumble the Italian state.



### The Red Brigades: The Dozier Affair

Like the Moro abduction and assassination, the kidnapping of US Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier thrust the BR into a new arena of operations and back into the front center stage of terrorism. Again like Moro, the mechanics of the operation were not new for the BR, but the target was. General Dozier was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics of the Allied Land Forces Southern European Command; he was an American general; a NATO general.

Up until this point, conventional wisdom had perceived the BR as an indigenous terrorist group committed to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles, but in pursuit of purely domestic objectives.<sup>147</sup> But as Pisano points out,

... but a more careful reading of their "communiques", "theoretical tracts", and "strategic resolutions", and a more attentive monitoring of their transnational contacts and activities, should have alerted the interested observer to the fact that in the logic of the BR there have always existed domestic as well as foreign enemies of the "proletarian movement" whose "vanguard" the BR believe themselves to be.<sup>148</sup>

Part of Pisano's analysis of the forewarning of BR intention's centers on the Resolution for Strategic Direction issued in 1978. In that document, the BR termed the Italian government "an instrument of the interests of imperialism headed by the US and the FRG".<sup>149</sup> It further defined NATO as, "the political-military organism to which imperialism entrusts the guiding role in relation to both the defense against the "external enemy" and the annihilation of the "internal enemy".<sup>150</sup> Dozier's selection as a target was probably assigned under these

guidelines, with the intent to fulfill some of that prophetic resolution.

Another aspect of why Dozier was the target of BR kidnappers was expressed by Bertram Brown, a terrorism consultant for the Rand Corporation. Brown felt the act was a BR maneuver "to regain their credibility".<sup>151</sup> The credibility is that which was lost when the Italian state failed to crumble under the abductions of Moro and other prominent Italians.

Franco Ferracuti, a Rome University professor of criminology, added his view of the abduction,

... the Red Brigades want to embarrass the US, to undermine NATO, and, not incidentally, to re-establish themselves as a force to be reckoned with.<sup>152</sup>

On 1 January 1982, the BR released a photograph of Dozier sitting under a BR banner, holding a placard "denouncing the imperialists".<sup>153</sup> Along with the photo came the second in a series of communiques and a separate 188-page document. The document, "Strategic Directives December 1981", was the first discussion of the BR's new policy of violent confrontation with NATO.<sup>154</sup> Information in the communique stated that Dozier would be interrogated and tried just as Moro had been; however, there were no conditions listed for his release.

In the third communique, the BR provided details of Dozier's interrogation. Part of the transcript covered an explanation by the "presiding officer to Dozier as to why he was captured: "Your military career is the story of American aggression against the battle for liberation and revolution in Southeast Asia and against the proletariat struggle in Europe".<sup>155</sup>

Just as Brown and Ferracuti had reasoned, Dozier was a symbol of a strong imperialist power and because of that strength, his capture was added stature for the BR.

Dozier was eventually rescued after 42 days of captivity by the elite antiterrorist squad of the Central Operative Security Nucleus.<sup>156</sup> This was only the second time in the history of BR kidnappings that the police were able to successfully rescue a victim.<sup>157</sup> For the first time in combatting Italian terrorism, the US had become involved in more than a rhetorical role. As reported by Time, "... from the beginning, the US Department of Defense had supplied a team of counterterrorist experts to aid in the search for Dozier".<sup>158</sup>

The effect on the BR of the loss of Dozier and fellow members caught by the police during will not be discernable for some time; however, Pisano gives an indication of what may point to future BR acts,

The extent of the damage inflicted upon the BR as a result of the coordinated police manhunt and dragnet that led to the general's liberation cannot be the object of an adequate assessment until after the BR conduct a demonstrative retaliatory action, as per established modus operandi, and resume their offensive, which has presumably been halted at least temporarily. The rapidity and nature of their response will be a determining indicator. Still, while there can be little doubt as to the stunning blow they suffered, it is not likely that their total structure has been disabled. Their long record of resiliency would suggest the availability of unscathed and untapped resources, whose deployment may however, take time.<sup>159</sup>

## Summary

To make any firm assertions about any activities that the BR may stage in the future would be equal to "climbing-out on the proverbial limb". However, one rather safe assumption can be made: The Red Brigades are anything but through and are certainly still capable of terrorist activities. As Pisano stated, they have a "resiliency" that may be unmatched by any other group.<sup>160</sup>

Part of that resiliency no doubt comes from what could be termed a latent sympathy, especially among the younger Italians. In a poll taken by the Italian newsmagazine L'Espresso, Time reported the following,

... in the 20- to 24-year-old age bracket, 21% believed that the Red Brigades were fighting for a better society, while 35% felt that the terrorists had the right ideals but were using the wrong means to achieve them. Only 27% said they would inform the authorities if they knew someone who was a terrorist.<sup>161</sup>

The latest setbacks, the Dozier rescue and large-scale police roundups of BR members, have no doubt hurt the BR; but, with the support as shown by the L'Espresso poll, those lost may be easily and quickly replaced.

Each day, more and more evidence surfaces that points to an international network of terrorist cooperation and support. The BR's Antonio Savasta has, by turning to the state for leniency, offered his knowledge of BR internal and external operations as payment for the leniency.<sup>162</sup> Claire Sterling's revealing work, The Terror Network, may be proved true by a

member of the well-respected BR.

For the present time, the BR seem to be relatively quiet, with only a few small operations since the Dozier rescue. The most recent was against a top Naples police official.<sup>163</sup> Almost six months had elapsed between the two acts. For the BR, time is of no real consequence,

... the hypothesis therefore is that of a long "entrenched war", ... It is not so much a matter of a speedy victory and of vanquishing all... but of growing in a struggle of long duration... Revolutionary process and not revolutionary moment.<sup>164</sup>

During the 1950's and 60's, Russia was symbolically likened to "a great sleeping bear", and the West would be wise to move quietly and cautiously so as not to wake the animal. Possibly, the BR are also taking a rest; but unlike the other sleeping giant, it does not take an outside noise to awake. The BR fervor in ideology and action puts the noise in the members ears. Though it appears quiet, within the organization there is still the noise of the revolution.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Excerpt from Carlo Pisacane's Political Testament, 1857, quoted in Juliet Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 63.

<sup>2</sup>King Umberto was assassinated in July 1900 at Monza, Italy.

<sup>3</sup>Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78", Terrorism: An International Journal 2 (Numbers 3 & 4, 1979), p. 173.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Paul Furlong, "Political Terrorism in Italy", in Juliet Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 60-63.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 61-62.

<sup>8</sup>Alessandro Silj, Never Again Without A Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979), pp. ix-xiii.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. xii.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. xiii.

<sup>11</sup>Régis Debray was a Frenchman and cohort of Che Guevara. He was with Guevara during the Bolivian exposition.

<sup>12</sup>This is an extract of how the Italian press reported the incident. Not alot of fanfare—the man was not yet identified.

<sup>13</sup>Claire Sterling, "Italy: The Feltrinelli Case", Atlantic, July 1972, p. 12.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Potere Operaio was a widely dispersed, semiclandestine group that specialized in street fighting and demonstration by labor groups.

- <sup>17</sup>Sterling, Italy: The Feltrinelli Case, pp. 14-16.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid, p. 16.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid, pp. 16-17.
- <sup>20</sup>Stefan T. Possony, "Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: The Millionaire Dinamitero", Terrorism: An International Journal 2 (Numbers 3 & 4, 1979), pp. 221-29.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 230.
- <sup>22</sup>Regis Debray quoted in Stefan T. Possony, "Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: The Millionaire Dinamitero", Terrorism: An International Journal 2 (Numbers 3 & 4, 1979), p. 230.
- <sup>23</sup>Selected from a survey of materials on Feltrinelli and the GAP.
- <sup>24</sup>Daniel Cohn-Bendit is a leader of "Sponti", a lesser-known group in Germany. His statement was quoted in Andrew Kopkind, "EURO-TERROR", New Times, June 12, 1978, p. 61.
- <sup>25</sup>Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy", Conflict Studies 120 (July 1980), pp. 5-6.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 6.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 7.
- <sup>30</sup>Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle, p. 97.
- <sup>31</sup>Kopkind, EURO-TERROR, p. 36.
- <sup>32</sup>Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle, pp. 100-103.
- <sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. xii.
- <sup>34</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 7.
- <sup>35</sup>Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle, pp. 101-102.
- <sup>36</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 7.
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>H.H.A. Cooper, "Terrorism and the Media", in Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger, eds., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), pp. 141-42.

<sup>39</sup>Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, (Havana: Tricontinental, n.d.).

<sup>40</sup>Marighella's Minimanual quoted in Robert D. Chapman and M. Lester Chapman, The Crimson Webb of Terror, (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1980), pp. 94-95.

<sup>41</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Democracy, p. 7.

<sup>42</sup>Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 151.

<sup>43</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 7.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle, pp. xiv-xv.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. xv.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Pisano, A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78, p. 184.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.



<sup>60</sup>Pisano, A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78, pp. 187-89.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 187-88.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "They Are Cowardly Bums", Time 118, December 28, 1981, p. 25.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Russ Hoyle, "Police! Marvelous!", Time 119, February 8, 1982, p. 36.

<sup>69</sup>"Red Brigades Admits a Defeat", San Francisco Chronicle, 8 February 1982, p. 12.

<sup>70</sup>Cited by Paul Furlong, "Political Terrorism in Italy", in Juliet Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 86.

<sup>71</sup>John B. Wolf, "Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups", "Terrorism: An International Journal" 1 (Number 2, 1978), pp. 169-70.

<sup>72</sup>Pisano, A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78, p. 192.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Furlong, Political Terrorism in Italy, p. 75.

<sup>75</sup>Pisano, A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78, p. 192.

<sup>76</sup>Wolf, Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups, p. 173.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Cited in Pisano, A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78, p. 192.

<sup>79</sup>Wolf, Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups, p. 172.

<sup>80</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 10.

<sup>81</sup>Furlong, Political Terrorism in Italy, p. 75.

<sup>82</sup>Claire Sterling in the Terror Network (p. 303) uses the title "high Strategic Command". This author was unable to ascertain which title is indeed used by the BR.

<sup>83</sup>Furlong, Political Terrorism in Italy, p. 75.

<sup>84</sup>Webster's New World Dictionary, rev. ed. (1979), s.v. "ideology".

<sup>85</sup>Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 16.

<sup>86</sup>Pisano, A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78, p. 193.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>Sterling, The Terror Network, pp. 7-8.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-85.

<sup>92</sup>Walter Lacquer, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), pp. 4-5.

<sup>93</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 7.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>95</sup>Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 151.

<sup>96</sup>Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle, p. 233.

<sup>97</sup>Kopkind, EURO-TERROR, p. 36.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>99</sup>Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 300.

<sup>100</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 9.

<sup>101</sup>Appendix C gives a numerical breakdown, while the last portion of the reference is to the Dozier kidnapping.

<sup>102</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, pp. 9-10.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>104</sup>This figure was taken from a review of available material and represents a "best" estimate.

<sup>105</sup>This figure was taken from a review of available materials and represents a "best" estimate.

<sup>106</sup>Pisano, A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78, p. 194.

<sup>107</sup>Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 10.

<sup>108</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 15.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>See table on page 20.

<sup>111</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 15.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>Mario Sossi, Benoa Attorney General, was kidnapped and interrogated.

<sup>114</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "The German Connection", Time, 28 August 1978, p. 33.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid.

<sup>116</sup>Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, pp. 16-18.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid.

- 124 Ibid.
- 125 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
- 126 \_\_\_\_\_, "Songs of the Pentiti," Time, 22 March 1982, p. 46.
- 127 Ibid.
- 128 Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 84.
- 129 \_\_\_\_\_, "The Terrorists Declare War," Time, 27 March 1978, p. 40.
- 130 Ibid.
- 131 Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 9.
- 132 \_\_\_\_\_, "The Terrorists Declare War," Time, 27 March 1978, p. 40.
- 133 Michael Ledeen, "Aldo Moro's Legacy," The New Republic, 13 May 1978, p. 24.
- 134 Ibid.
- 135 Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy, p. 10.
- 136 Gino Pallotta, Obiettivo Moro: un Attacco al cuore dello Stato (Roma: Newton Compton, 1978), p. 1.
- 137 Ibid., p. 19.
- 138 Ibid., p. 20.
- 139 \_\_\_\_\_, "The Moro Tragedy Goes On," Time, 8 May 1978, p. 32.
- 140 \_\_\_\_\_, "Most Barbarous Assassins," Time, 22 May 1978, p. 30.
- 141 \_\_\_\_\_, "A Further Plea," Time, 17 April 1978, p. 37.
- 142 Ibid.
- 143 \_\_\_\_\_, "Most Barbarous Assassins," Time, 22 May 1978, p. 30.
- 144 Ibid.
- 145 Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>147</sup>Vittorfranco Pisano, "Terrorism in Italy: The Dozier Affair," The Police Chief, April 1982, p. 38.

<sup>148</sup>Ibid.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid.

<sup>151</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Looking for General Dozier," Time, 4 January 1982, p. 57.

<sup>152</sup>Ibid.

<sup>153</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Manhunt," Time, 11 January 1982, p. 28.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid.

<sup>155</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Taunting Clues," Time, 18 January 1982, p. 30.

<sup>156</sup>The Central Operative Security Nucleus was created after the Moro assassination and replaced what many Italians felt was a too politically oriented SID.

<sup>157</sup>On 5 June 1975, Italian industrialist Vittorio Gancia was freed by police during a raid on a BE hideout near Turin.

<sup>158</sup>Russ Hoyle, "Police! Marvelous!" Time, 8 February 1982, p. 38.

<sup>159</sup>Pisano, "Terrorism in Italy: The Dozier Affair," The Police Chief, April 1982, p. 40.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid.

<sup>161</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Taunting Clues," Time, 18 January 1982, p. 30.

<sup>162</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Songs of the Pentiti," Time, 22 March 1982, p. 46.

<sup>163</sup>"Red Brigades Kill Naples Police Official, Driver," The Sacramento Bee, 16 July 1982, p. A8.

<sup>164</sup>Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle, p. 106.

### Chapter III

#### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Red Brigades are not the Communist Party of Combat, but an armed vanguard which works inside the metropolitan proletariat for its construction.

While we affirm that BR and Party of Combat are not identical, we affirm with equal clarity that the armed vanguard must "act as a Party" from the very beginning.<sup>1</sup>

#### Summary

The purpose of this study has been to examine and assimilate information on the terrorist organization known as the Red Brigades in order to provide a description of that organization that has not been previously available. A secondary purpose was to present a study which would enable the criminologist, sociologist, and politician to better understand the BR organization, so as to develop techniques for dealing with its demands for social and governmental change through terrorist activity.

By examining and compiling the literature currently available on the Red Brigades, the author has provided an overview of the conditions in Italy that have proved to be a fertile breeding ground for terrorism spawned by both the

political Left and Right. Although there have been a number of transitions, or phases, through which Italian terrorism has moved, basic ideology on both sides has remained primarily the same. The most dramatic changes can be seen in the escalation of violence as each organization feels the need to increase assaults on the state for its inabilities or unresponsiveness to demands. In either arena, Left or Right, it is evident that neither is content with established governmental or socio-economic status. Both have in the last decade substantiated through deeds that they are committed to their cause and not easily moved to resignation or defeat. Their goal is and has been the overthrow of the Italian government, to be evidentially replaced by the one the each engenders to be the perfect solution.

This study has described the Red Brigades as they are, and not in the sensationalism as normally reported in connected with each terrorist act. The BR is now an established part of the political situation in Italy. Its place in the Italian far left political position becomes more concrete with each passing year. Because of their ability to sustain the organization, even after numerous arrests and suppression actions by the state, the BR are the most dangerous group in Italy and potentially the most dangerous in all of Europe. As Paul Furlong stated, "...there is little the Italian state can give the terrorists other than its own dissolution...".<sup>2</sup>

## Conclusion

## ORGANIZATION

The Red Brigade organization is structured along rigid military organization and command/control regimentation. Although this type of organization does not in itself readily accept outside associations, other groups have become affiliated with the BR. The most prominent of these groups is the Front Line (PL) terrorist organization. The PL liaison to the BR has been confirmed by documents found in the possession of Corrado Alunni during his capture in September 1978.<sup>3</sup>

The strength of other terrorist group affiliation to the BR is of this date not known in concrete terms. The most reported assumption lies in the belief that the contacts have been only to agree on future cooperation, if needed in the fight against the Italian state. Although contacts exists, the autonomy of each group has not been jeopardized or weakened. However, the organization of a federation of leftist groups should not be discounted as not possible. Should situations dictate that a concerted effort be necessary for the survival of the leftist movement, all indications point to the BR as being capable of bringing about such a coalition.

In establishing its international intent, the BR has been more open. In February of 1978, the BR issued its "strategic resolution", and included in that document its view of the need to develop international ties. Although, the "strategic resolution" formalized the BR belief that international ties were essential, BR members had previously made



contacts with German, French, Irish, Spanish, and Palestinian terrorists.

In maintaining a national and international organization, the BR has exhibited its ability to operate, but yet remain essentially underground. This in itself is no small feat and can be attributed to the well-disciplined and well-run BR organization. By design, each unit is isolated, but fully autonomous, and receives instructions/details through a filtration system. By maintaining secrecy and deception throughout the command and control system, the organization ensures the survival of itself even if one or several members are arrested.

Equally important to the survival of the organization as the combat arm, is the administrative and logistical services. Organized along the same lines of structure and communication, these services are run also as covertly as possible. However, one section appears in an above-ground agency. This agency is the leftist-newspaper Controinformazione. The paper serves as the day-to-day spokesman for the BR. From its above-ground position, Controinformazione serves not only a propaganda value, but also as recruiter, contact point and intelligence unit.

To summarize, the organizational structure and the accompanying regulations that govern operations appear to constitute an operation that is capable of resisting government efforts to crumble it. Its sectional, but fully autonomous structure is ideally suited for clandestine terrorist opera-

tions and has proven its value under heavy government assaults.

#### MEMBERSHIP

It is difficult to assess the current composition of the BR because most recent recruiting practices have slipped away from the ideals of the "historic nucleus". However, information available on identified or captured BR members provide what appears to be a representative cross-section of the organization.

BR members are mostly from the northern region of Italy; however, within the membership every region of the country is represented.<sup>4</sup> The majority of members fall into the twenty-three to thirty-three age bracket<sup>5</sup> and the majority were university students.<sup>6</sup> Most BR members belonged, at one time, to the Italian Communist Party, its youth organization, or to other extraparliamentary parties or movements of the Left.<sup>7</sup> The spectrum of social class affiliation is quite diverse, covering all classes; however, the majority would be placed into the lower middle-class.<sup>8</sup>

The exact number of members is not known, but at best estimate ranges between 7,500 to 9,000 members.<sup>9</sup> As is normal in any evaluation of an underground organization, the accuracy of any count is suspect.

#### TACTICS

The Red Brigades have made the fullest use of the total spectrum of tactics. From simple propaganda statements to

kidnap/assassination, the BR have been involved. The basic premise of the tactics used stems from ensuring success of the operation and its subsequent value to the revolution.

The initial tactics of the BR were not centered around the extremely violent acts as characterized by the majority of acts from 1976 to date. Most early acts were harassment actions to press for low-key demands.

As the group noted lesser reaction to its demands and what could have been seen as a failing revolution, tactics took on a more violent form. The BR started a program of terror that involved the much publicized tactic of "kneecapping". Accompanying this period, was an increase in kidnappings of political and industrial figures.

The final escalation of violence to the assassination stage has been the most dramatic aspect of BR operations. This tactic has been leveled against those the BR felt were the most detrimental to its cause. The assassination of Aldo Moro points to the degree of violence and extremism the BR will go to if the organization feels such action necessary.

Because of the high degree of success in its operations, the BR can be expected to continue with current tactics. Even as the BR points out, each failure provides new information on how to better handle the next operation.

In summation, the tactics of the BR are designed to be highly visible and disturbing. The BR does not seek a lull in activities, but in essence wants to put the state in such a position that it can not ignore the BR at anytime. Such a

condition, puts the state in a situation of reacting to the BR and ignoring other socio-economic areas. In such a situation, the BR has won, because it points to the state as not capable of providing for the people. In any condition, BR tactics will reflect the ultimate desired outcome and will carry a degree of violence needed to ensure that outcome.

#### IDEOLOGY AND GOALS

The BR see Italy as being dominated and abused into "an imperialist state of the multinationals".<sup>10</sup> And in this view, they put the Christian-Democratic Party as the leading representative of the imperialists. The Communist Party of Italy are also named in collaboration with the DC and imperialists. Much of the name-calling is the essence of the Marxist-Leninist line the BR claim to follow. The true line maybe slightly more Stalinist oriented because of the use of extreme violence to ensure the revolution and eventual freeing of the people.

The goal of the BR is "to mobilize, to extend and to deepen the armed initiative against the political, economic, and military centers of the imperialist state of the multinationals".<sup>11</sup> The latter segment of the above ideological statement ("... and military centers...") was demonstrated by the kidnapping of General Dozier.

Each section, or item to be attacked, as stated in ideological rhetoric, has in fact become a goal of the BR. Also, the tactical flow of events, from political, to economic,

to military, has followed the original ideological statement as if it were the pattern for placement of each event. For this view, it can be said the BR are committed to the task they see before them and have mapped a strategy borne in ideology but cemented to reality by firm organizational goals.

### Recommendations

#### GOVERNMENT

The Italian government has been, since World War II, plagued by the pestilence of inability: the inability to form a united government. Currently, Italy has empowered its 41st government in the post-war era, and even this newly elected government is a five-party coalition. The ineffectiveness of a see-saw government is at the crux of many of Italy's problems. This lack of cohesiveness in governmental affairs actually fuels the fire of terrorism. First, it provides the issues around which the terrorist builds his campaign rhetoric. Without those issues terrorists and their acts become nothing more than criminals to the majority of the citizenry.

The gift by an unified and efficient government is its ability to adequately address the needs of the people it serves. If the Italian people are shown and convinced that their democratic-ruled coalition government does work to serve the needs of the people, there would be no need for them to support terrorists, who by their acts guarantee to effect change. It is obvious that from the success of the BR, some degree of

popular support is available. The absence of strong governmental policies and measures has allowed the terrorist to draw on this support. The only cure is to form a unified government capable of regaining the faith and confidence of the people.

#### ITALIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Current developments in anti-terrorist tactics and the establishment of an elite unit to combat terrorism have placed the Italian law enforcement organizations into a position of strength from which to continue their efforts. However, a caution should be voiced over the need to avoid the "faction-making" that was evident in the Moro investigations. Self-serving and disjointed police agencies have little to offer in combatting terrorism, and the return to such organizations could be disastrous for the Italian state.

The continuation of the elite anti-terrorist unit and governmental support in all operations are a must, as was evidenced by the successful investigation and rescue of the kidnapped General Dozier. Further use of monitoring/search activities, coupled with selective use of captured members, who desire to turn state's evidence for leniency considerations is a procedure that should be continued and refined.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The idea that terrorism belongs to the state where the act takes place has, in recent years, been discounted. The

BR kidnapping of a high NATO official (General Dozier) should be the final warning to the world community and its criminal justice agencies. — No longer is terrorism against one state, the sole concern of that state. The transnational intentions of most major groups are well known and as each day passes, their capabilities to implement these intentions becomes more of a reality.

The unification of the world community is perhaps a bit utopian, but the uniting of world police agencies is not. Clear methods and expeditious means of transferring information and personnel assistance must be established. The after-the-fact methods currently employed, where agencies have the option of complying, may will be inadequate in view of possible future terrorist operations.

#### NEED FOR FURTHER STUDY

Although many questions have been answered concerning the Red Brigades, the need for continued study and observation of the group is necessary to ensure currency and expansion of data. The BR, like all other terrorist groups, is not static in operation. The group does not adopt one single procedure or method, and continue with it forever. As each scenario changes, the dictums that assert how the members will carry-out that operation will change. To fully understand any dynamic organization, no one set period of study will suffice, but only deliberate, continuous observation and questioning are needed.

This study has also pointed out the relationships that are known to exist between the BR and other Italian terrorist groups, as well as other groups in different countries. Although the relationship is known, its scope and depth of commitments by the various groups are largely unanswered. Further study is needed to determine the extent of these contacts and the result that such contacts have had, or will have, on the BR and the associated groups.

Lastly, and possibly the most important question to be answered, involves the complexities of outside political/governmental sponsorship. As this study has pointed out, training and financing of the BR may be coming from within the Soviet sphere of influence. However, questions concerning degree of involvement and especially ability to control BR actions are essentially unanswered. In the hope of achieving an understanding the true workings of the BR, these points must be answered.

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"Their moral being consists in being revolutionaries, in acting for that single aim, sacrificing all else to it: their personal life, their individual tastes and preferences, their own gentleness, their sympathy for the individual man and woman, their own maternity, and their own children... Leninism is a political asceticism in which there are no rights because everything is subordinated to an objective."<sup>12</sup>



#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>From the Risoluzione della Direzione Strategica, February 1978, quoted in Juliet Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) p. 66.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>3</sup>Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy", Conflict Studies 120 (July 1980): 13.

<sup>4</sup>Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78", Terrorism: An International Journal 2 (Numbers 3-4, 1979): 191-92.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 192

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 193

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Francesco Alberoni, a "brigadist", quoted in Alessandro Silj, Never Again Without a Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979), p.208.

## APPENDIX A

### Chronology of BR Events 1971-1982.

#### 1971

- Sep. 17 First action (fire-bombing of an automobile belonging to a Sit-Siemens executive) signed by the BR.
- Oct. 20 BR first mentioned in print by leftist newspaper, The Red Autumn Has Already Begun.
- Nov. -  
Dec. Actions (firebombing cars, harassment) against Pirelli.

#### 1972

- Mar. 3 BR kidnap Idalgo Macchiarini, personnel manager of SIT-Siemans of Milan.
- Mar. 13 BR kidnap Bartolomeo Di Mino, deputy-secretary of the Cesano Boscone MSI section in Milan.
- Mar. 14 Giangiacomo Feltrinelli is killed in an accidental detonation of a dynamite bomb he was attempting to set beneath a high-tension pylon in part of northern Italy's power grid.
- Mid - to  
late 1972 Actions continue, but BR is relatively quiet and non-violent. Six abductions occur.

#### 1973

- Feb. 12 BR kidnap Bruno Labate, provincial secretary of labor union connected to the MSI.

Jun. 28 BR kidnap Michele Mincuzzi, an Alfa Romeo production manager in Milan.

Dec. 10 Ettore Amerio, personnel manager of Fiat in Turin, is kidnapped by BR.

Dec. 18 Ettore Amerio is released after interrogation.

1974

Apr. 18 Public prosecutor of Genoa, Mario Sossi, was kidnapped by the BR.

May 23 Mario Sossi is released after interrogation and "people's trial".

Jun. 17 A BR commando unit kills two MSI party members during a raid on the MSI Padua office.

Sep. 8 Renato Curcio and Alberto Franceshini are captured. An infiltrator, known as "Brother Machinegun" led the Carabinieri to the BR leaders.

Oct. 15 Roberto Ognibene is captured.

1975

Feb. 18 "Mara", Margherita Cagol, leads BR commando raid on Casale Monferrato prison and frees Curcio.

Jun. 4 Margherita "Mara" Cagol is killed in a shootout with the Carabinieri.

Oct. 8 BR abducts Enrico Boffa, head of Singer in Milan. He is "kneecapped" then released.

Oct. 9 BR abducts Vincenzo Casabona. He is beaten and given a "haircut".

Oct. 28 BR raids Confindustria union in Milan.

Dec. 10 BR raids Milan Carabinieri barracks and destroys a military vehicle.

Dec. 17 Dr. Vittorio Solera, a Fiat medical employee,

is kneecapped.

### 1976

Jan. 13 Milan Carabinieri barracks is attacked.  
 Jan. 14 Genoa Carabinieri barracks is attacked.  
 Jan. 19 Renato Curcio is re-arrested.  
 Jun. 7 Genoa Chief Prosecutor Francesco Coco, and his chauffeur and bodyguard were killed by BR gunmen.  
 Mid - to Late 1976 BR actions were limited to industrial and political targets.

### 1977

Jan. 12 Pietro Costa, a shipping entrepreneur, is abducted. Pansom is set at 1.5 billion Lira.  
 Mid-Feb. BR kneecaps three executives in a 24-hour period.  
 Mar. 4 More than 1,000 leftist demonstrators riot in Rome over jailing of student Fabrizio Panzieri, who was found guilty of killing neo-Fascist sympathizer Mikis Mantaxae two years ago.  
 Mar. 12 Guiseppe Ciotta, a police NCO responsible for arrest of brigadist Anna Garizio, is assassinated by three BR members.  
 March - April Leftist students riot in major cities. Unemployment, social conditions major causes.  
 Apr. 28 Fulvio Croce, the president of the Turin Bar Association, is assassinated by three BR gunmen.  
 Late April - May Italian government begins crackdown on demonstrators.

- Jun. 4 Three journalists are assaulted by BR members. BR is attacking press because organization believes the press is an ally of the government.
- Jun. 22 BR gunmen shoot Rome University Professor Remo Cacciafesta in the legs and set fire to seven buses.
- Jul. 1 Two Fiat car company executives are wounded and a night watchman shot to death, following a series of bombings in Bologna, Pordenone, Rome and Spoleto. Auto executives are shot in Turin and Milan. BR claims responsibility of all acts.
- Jul. 8 BR gunmen wound journalist Antonio Garzotto.
- Aug. 25 Petra Krause is released after 29 months of imprisonment without trial. She will be extradited to Switzerland in Sep. 1977.
- Oct. 12 Fiat car works union official, Rinaldo Camaioni, is shot in the legs. BR claims responsibility.
- Nov. 3 Christian-Democratic member, Pubblio Fiori, is shot by BR gunmen.
- Nov. 11 Fiat executive, Piero Osella, is shot in Turin, by BR gunmen.
- Nov. 17 Carlo Casalegno, deputy editor-in-chief of newspaper La Stampa, is shot four times. BR claims responsibility. (On Nov. 30, Casalegno died.)
- Dec. 20 Austrian police release information concerning connections between West Germany's Red Army Faction and the BR. Information was gained during investigation into the kidnapping of Walter Michael Palmers.
- Dec. 29 New-Fascist Angelo Pistolesi was shot to death on a Rome street. BR claims responsibility.

1978

- Feb. 15 National Prison Service official Dr. Riccardo Palma is shot in Rome. BR claims responsibility.
- Mar. 10 Founding members of BR go on trial in Turin.
- Mar. 11 Rosario Berardi, police official noted for his fight against terrorists, is killed in Turin. BR claims responsibility.
- Mar. 16 Aldo Moro, one of Italy's most influential politicians, is kidnapped by the BR.
- Mar. 19 BR release photo of Moro and statement declaring war on the state.
- Mar. 25 Giovanni Picco, ex-mayor of Turin, is wounded by BR gunmen.
- Apr. 5 BR releases photocopy of Moro letter.
- Apr. 7 BR gunmen shoot Genoa Industrialists Association President, Felice Schiavetti.
- Apr. 10 BR reject negotiations for Moro
- Apr. 11 BR release second Moro letter.
- Apr. 12 Cristoforo Piancone is arrested as a BR member.
- Apr. 16 BR communique states Moro has been sentenced to die after his trial by a "peoples" court.
- Apr. 21 BR releases photo of Moro. Gives state 48 hours to release prisoners or Moro will be executed.
- Apr. 25 BR publishes list of 13 prisoners that must be released to save Moro.
- Apr. 27 BR gunmen shoot and wound Girolama Mechilli, former head of regional government of Latium.
- Apr. 28 BR gunmen wound Fiat executive Sergio Palmieri.
- Apr. 29 BR releases new Moro letter pleading for exchange.

May 10            Body of Aldo Moro is found in a parked car in Rome.

May 11            Renato Curcio justifies BR killing of Moro as "revolutionary justice".

May 13            BR gunmen shot Christian-Democratic District Office secretary Tito Berardino in the leg.

Jun. 7            Antonio Santoro, Chief Prison Warden of Udine, is shot to death by BR.

Jun. 15           The BR detonate a chain of time bombs at Rome Municipal Electric and Water Authority, causing \$600,000 in damages.

Jun. 20           Case against 15 BR members in Turin trial goes to jury.

Jun. 22           BR gunmen kill Genoa Police Commander Antonio Esposito.

Jun. 24           Renato Curcio receives 15 year sentence in Turin trial.

Jul. 6            Gavino Manca, Pirelli Rubber Company executive, is shot in the leg in Milan. BR claims responsibility.

Sep. 13           BR leader Corrado Alunni is captured.

Sep. 29           Lancia Company foreman, Piero Coggiola is assassinated by BR.

Oct. 2            Antonio Savino, BR leader, is arrested, along with Nadia Mantovani and Mario Moretti.

Oct. 11           Justice Department Penal Affairs Bureau Chief Girolamo Tartaglione is shot to death by BR.

Dec. 16           BR gunmen kill two policemen outside Turin prison.

1979

- Jan. 22            Police find BR hide-out in Turin.
- Jan. 25            Guido Rossa, Communist labor leader, is shot and killed in Genoa. BR claims responsibility.
- Mar. 15            Fiat executive, Giulian Farina, is shot and wounded by BR gunmen.
- Mar. 22            Industrialist Attilio Dutto is critically injured in Cuneo, when his car is demolished by a BR bomb.
- Apr. 9             Sixteen suspected BR members are arrested in Rome and northern Italy.
- Apr. 25            French police announce they have found clandestine "strategic headquarters" of BR in Paris.
- May 12             BR claims responsibility for March 3, 1979 attack on Rome city headquarters of Christian-Democratic Party.
- May 24             Three men and one woman handcuff Christian-Democratic City Councilor, Rossella Sborgi, to a railing, pour can of glue on her head, then hang BR sign on her neck and take photographs.
- May 31             Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda, BR members, are arrested in connection with Moro affair.
- Jun. 2             BR members set fire to car of Rosella Sborgi.
- Jun. 21            Italian police announce they have uncovered a BR plan to assassinate Rev. Paul Marcinkus, President of Vatican Bank.
- Jul. 14            Col. Alfonso Varisco, head of paramilitary Carabinieri police force at Italy's Justice Ministry, is gunned down on his way to work. BR claims responsibility.
- Jul. 28            A Rome left-wing newspaper, The Struggle Continues, prints a 20-page document showing that the BR has become embroiled in a bitter in-



ternal dispute.

- Aug. 11 Renato Curcio, in a letter to Italian Prime Minister Pertini, defend BR leaders and urge continuation of terrorist attacks. The letter was smuggled-out of prison and given to two Italian publications.
- Sep. 26 Prospero Gallinari, a BR member, is arrested in Rome.
- Oct. 18 Renato Curcio and 13 other BR leaders are given additional sentences for their courtroom behavior during 1978 trial.
- Nov. 22 BR members fire rocket at armored police car outside Turin court where captured BR members are on trial.
- Dec. 15 BR gunmen shoot and kill Fiat factory foreman and guard, and steal \$600,000 in payroll money in Turin.

1980

- Jan. 9 BR members ambush and shoot to death three Milan policemen.
- Jan. 20 BR terrorists claim responsibility for bombing a police barracks in Rome. Eighteen police officers involved in counter-terrorist work were wounded.
- Jan. 26 BR terrorists kill senior state police officer Lt Col Emanuele Tuttobene and his driver Constable Antonio Caser.
- Jan. 30 Silvio Gori, technical manager at a chemical plant near Venice is shot to death. BR claims responsibility.
- Feb. 6 Paolo Paoletti, chief engineer of Swiss-owned Iemesa chemical plant that in July 1976 caused Italy's worst pollution disaster, is shot and killed.
- Feb. 7 Gunmen firing from a motor scooter kill a Rome policeman.
- Feb. 8 Suspected informer William Waccher is killed outside his Milan home.
- Feb. 11 Mario Miraglia, manager of a scientific consulting company, is shot in the leg by two terrorists.
- Feb. 13 Vittorio Bachelet, leading magistrate and law professor, is shot to death at Rome University. BR claim responsibility.
- Feb. 22 Rocco Micaletto and Patrizio Peci, two suspected leaders of BR wanted in connection with Moro affair are arrested.
- Feb. 26 Brinks subsidiary in Rome is robbed of \$840,000. BR claims responsibility.
- Mar. 16 Chief prosecutor of Salerno is shot to death. BR claims responsibility.
- Mar. 20 Girolamo Minervini, a judge on the highest

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THE RED BRIGADES: A DESCRIPTION OF A TERRORIST  
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
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- Italian court of appeals, is shot to death on a city bus in Rome. BR claims responsibility.
- Mar. 25 Three members of Italy's elite paramilitary police, the Carabinieri, are shot to death outside of Milan. BR claim responsibility.
- " Genoa University Professor Giancarlo Moretti is shot in the legs by a young woman. BR claims responsibility.
- Mar. 29 Police shoot and kill four BR members. One is identified as Anna Maria Ludman.
- Mar. 30 Franco Pinna and Enrico Bianco, sought in connection with Moro affair, are arrested in France.
- Apr. 2 Police officers in Bologna and Ancona arrest five BR members.
- Apr. 15 Italian police have arrested about 45 people in the last few days on suspicion of being members of BR terrorist organization, and authorities are hinting that a major breakthrough in fight against terrorism has been achieved; most of arrests took place in Turin, Milan and Biella; for the first time there are indications that information leading to arrests was provided by confessed BR members already in jail; new developments appear to have started with the arrest in February in Turin of Patrizio Peci and Rocco Micaletto, known members of group who have been sought by police for several years.
- Apr. 16 Patrizio Reci, jailed leader of the BR has reportedly confessed that he played a part in kidnapping of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Peci named others involved and gave detailed account of the kidnapping.
- Apr. 20 Eduardo Arnaldi, who had been acting as defense counsel for several members of the BR committed suicide, moments after being arrested on charges of being a terrorist.
- Apr. 21 Rossana Matiuzi, a BR member, was arrested in northern Greek port of Kavalla.
- Apr. 29 Corrado Alunni is in critical condition after a shootout with police during an attempted jailbreak from a Milan prison.

- May 13      Alfredo Albanese, head of anti-terrorist police force in Venice region, is shot to death in Mestre, Italy. BR claims responsibility.
- May 20      Pino Amato, a Christian-Democrate politician, is shot to death in Naples. BR claims responsibility.
- May 29      Walter Tobagi, staff writer for Corriese della Sera of Milan, who specialized in coverage of political terrorism, is shot and killed in Milan. BR claims responsibility.
- Oct. 29      Italian police arrest 20 suspected BR members after a three month investigation into terrorist activities in northwestern Italy.
- Nov. 23      Renato Briano, a factory personnel manager in Milan, is killed by the RB. This ends a six-month period where little left-wing terrorism has taken place.
- Nov. 29      Manfredo Massanti, a Milan industrialist, is shot to death. BR claims responsibility.
- Dec. 3      Dr. Giuseppe Furci, chief medical officer of Rome's central prison, is shot to death outside his Rome home. BR claim responsibility.
- Dec. 14      Giovanni D'Urso, high-ranking magistrate in Justice Ministry, is kidnapped by BR.
- Dec. 15      BR releases statement of intent to put D'Urso on a "people's trial".
- Dec. 28      Italian government submits to BR demand on release of D'Urso and will close the maximum security prison on Asinara Island.
- Dec. 29      About 100 prisoners revolt and take-over maximum security prison in Trani, Italy. Nineteen guards are taken hostage. Jailed terrorists at a prison in Reggio Calabria stage a protest in support of BR.
- Dec. 30      Paramilitary police regain Trani prison after a helicopter raid.

1981

- Jan. 1 Enrico Galvaligi, deputy commander of Carabinieri antiterrorist force in northern Italy, is shot to death in Rome.
- Jan. 2 Mario Scialoja, editor of magazine L'Espresso, which plans to publish interview with fugitives of BR, is arrested and charged with aiding and abetting terrorists.
- Jan. 3 BR issues statement claiming responsibility for killing of Galvaligi and warns of more attacks.
- " Giampaolo Bultrini, second journalist from weekly magazine L'Espresso, is arrested in connection with publication of interview with BR.
- Jan. 5 BR releases message stating that Judge Giovanni D'Urso has been sentenced to death.
- Jan. 6 The Italian government rejects BR conditions for release of D'Urso.
- Jan. 8 Renato Curcio urges BR to free D'Urso.
- Jan. 11 BR sets 48 hour deadline for publication of terrorist statements or D'Urso's imprisonment "great victory".
- Feb. 14 Police arrest prominent lawyers Eduardo di Giovanni and Gimvanna Lombardi and Carmine Fiorilla, editor of left-wing magazine Controcorrenti, on charges of acting as spokesmen and propagandists for BR.
- Feb. 18 Dr. Luigi Marangoni, head of state-run Polyclinic Hospital, Milan, is shot to death. BR claims responsibility.
- Feb. 19 BR statement on Marangoni shooting says action was a protest against attempts to reorganize state medical service.
- Mar. 13 Foreman at Milan Alfa Romeo car plant is shot and wounded. BR claims responsibility.

- Apr. 5 Mario Moretti is arrested in northern Italy. Moretti was wanted in connection with Moro kidnapping and murder.
- Apr. 8 Raffaele Cinotti, a prison warden in Rome, is killed. BR releases statement taking responsibility and say they are still capable of terrorist activities without Moretti.
- Apr. 11 Milan appeals court upholds conviction and sentence of Renato Curcio.
- Apr. 28 Prominent Italian politician Ciriaco De Mita is kidnapped and his two-man escort killed. BR claims responsibility.
- Jun. 4 Renzo Sandrucci, an Alfa Romeo auto company executive, is kidnapped. BR Claims responsibility.
- Jun. 10 Swiss arrest Giustino de Vuono in Lucerne, in connection with murder of Aldo Moro.
- Jun. 20 Terrorists in Pescara shoot brother of former member of BR who had cooperated with police.
- Jul. 7 BR kill Giuseppe Taliercio, a hostage.
- Jul. 10 BR threaten to kill Ciriaco De Mita, whom they have held for 2½ months.
- Jul. 16 BR issues statement threatening to kill Ciriaco De Mita in 48 hours, if demands are not met.
- Jul. 24 BR releases Renzo Sandrucci.
- Jul. 25 BR releases Ciriaco De Mita, who had been held for 90 days.
- Aug. 4 BR in a bid to keep arrested members of organization from cooperating with police, kill brother of Patrizio Peci, former terrorist leader, who had been invaluable police informer for last five months.
- Oct. 20 Two antiterrorist policemen are killed and a third injured in an attack in Milan. BR claims responsibility.
- Nov. 9 Carlo Bozzo and Gianluigi Cristiani, members of the BR who turned state's witness, say they received shipment of submachine guns and hand grenades from Palestinian guerrillas.



- Nov. 29 Trials are ordered for 42 leftist terrorists, most members of Front Line group.
- Dec. 17 BR kidnapps Brigadier General James L. Dozier from his Verona apartment.
- Dec. 20 BR issues first "communique" on Dozier stressing world issues, but no demands for his release.
- Dec. 21 Six US antiterrorist experts join Italian police in hunt for Dozier.
- Dec. 28 BR release second "communique" and photo of Dozier. Statement that Dozier had been placed on trial.
- Dec. 30 US and Italian governments issue statement on agreement of no negotiations for Dozier.

1982

- Jan. 1 BR issue photo of kidnapped Dozier to Rome office of New York Times. This was the first time in the 10 years of BR operations that the group made contact with a foreign news organization.
- Jan. 3 Four suspected female terrorists escaped from the Rovigo women's prison after accomplices blasted a hole in the prison wall. They were Susanna Ronconi (PL), Marina Premoli (BR), Federica Neroni (PL), and Loredana Biancamano (BR).
- Jan. 6 Anonymous callers to a Rome newspaper say Dozier is dead, having been executed by a BR tribunal.
- " BR members shoot Nicola Simone, deputy chief of Rome's antiterrorist squad.
- Jan. 7 The BR release a document labelled as a transcript of Dozier's interrogation. This was the third message since the kidnapping.
- Jan. 9 Rome police arrest BR leader Giovanni Senzanni and 10 other members as suspects in Dozier case.
- Jan. 13 Police discover BR armory containing "Soviet-made anti-tank rockets, grenade launchers, and shells powerful enough to penetrate thick steel plates". Documents indicated the munitions were obtained from Middle Eastern sources.
- Jan. 16 Police discover an abandoned BR hide-out in a house outside Rome. Materials and equipment found in the house are linked to a 6 Jan 82 shooting of police official, Nicola Simone.
- Jan. 17 Police discover cache of explosives in Biella (northern Italy) and arrest five BR suspects. The cache included 1,000 sticks of explosive gelignite, 764 detonators, and 750 yards of fuse cable.
- Jan. 19 Italian police state they have identified six BR members that took part in the kidnapping

of Dozier.

- Jan. 20      Police, searching for Dozier, found three BR hide-outs. Documents found in the hide-outs outlined plans for attacks on police stations and Christian-Democratic headquarters. One apartment belonged to Giovanni Senzanni, a suspected regional leader.
- Jan. 25      The BR released a fifth message and photo of Dozier, claiming there would be no negotiations for his release.
- Jan. 28      General Dozier is rescued by an elite Italian antiterrorist squad. Dozier was being held in an apartment in Padua, Italy.
- Jan. 29      Italian police link Antonio Savasta and Emilia Libera, two of the 5 kidnappers taken during the Dozier rescue, to the 1978 kidnapping and slaying of Aldo Moro and other major terrorist operations. Also they link Savasta and Cesare di Leonardo to the kidnapping and killing of industrialist Giuseppe Taliercio.
- Jan. 30      Italian police reveal that the location of the "people's prison" where Dozier was held, was given to them through a BR member turned informer. His name Paolo Galati.
- Jan. 31      At least 34 suspected BR members and eight members of the PL were arrested during the period of the Dozier kidnap.
- Feb. 1      Police acting on data obtained from Dozier's kidnappers find "prison" where former Prime Minister Aldo Moro was kept. The apartment was in the Rome suburbs and was inhabited in 1978 by terrorist Anna Laura Braghetti.
- Feb. 2      Italian police arrest seven BR suspects. Five are suspects in the 6 Jan 82 shooting of Nicola Simone, deputy chief of Rome's anti-terrorist squad.
- Feb. 4      Italian police arrest 22 BR suspects. Arrests were made in Florence, Turin, Verona, and Rome. In Florence, police arrested a high-ranking union executive and his wife. Luigi Scricciolo, chief of the international office of the Italiana Union of Labor, and his wife Paola, were charged with subversive association and belonging to armed bands.

- Feb. 7 The BR released its first statement on the rescue of General Dozier, calling it a victory for the "imperialist bourgeoisie". The statement also indicated the BR plans more attacks despite the series of arrests that police say have dismantled the group.
- Feb. 9 Five BR terrorists raid an Army depot near Naples and flee with a load of weapons.
- Mar. 1 Italian police uncover BR prison-break plot for a massive assault on Milan's San Vittore maximum security prison. The plot was an attempt to free BR member Pasqua Aurora Betti and six other inmates. Seventeen (17) BR suspects were arrested.
- Mar. 8 Trial opens in Verona, Italy, for 16 BR terrorists charged with Dozier kidnapping. Eight of those charged will be tried in absentia.
- Mar. 9 BR member Cesare di Lenardo testifies he was tortured by police. Testimony was given during the Dozier kidnapping trial.
- Mar. 16 Antonio Savasta, leader of the Dozier kidnapping, testified that a Bulgarian Embassy employee offered the BR money, arms and aid after the abduction. Savasta also said that Spanish, West German, and French terrorist groups offered unconditional assistance and that they had received weapons from the PLO for at least three years up to April 1981.
- Mar. 17 During testimony given at the Dozier kidnapping trial, Giovanni Ciucci stated, "I could have killed Dozier but no longer considered him an enemy". Ciucci said Antonio Savasta, leader of the kidnap gang, saw police gathering outside the Padua apartment where Dozier was held and handed out guns and a grenade to the four other BR members in the apartment.
- Mar. 18 Brigadier General Dozier testifies at the trial of 16 BR terrorists accused in his kidnapping.
- Mar. 23 BR defense lawyers pleaded for leniency in the Dozier kidnapping trial. Also, they restated the allegations of police torture by some defendants should persuade the court to hand down reduced sentences.
- Mar. 31 Florence police arrest Luigi Gastadello as

the sixth suspect in Dozier kidnapping case.

- Apr. 14      Sixty-three (63) BR suspects went on trial today. Twenty-three are charged with the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro. The 70,000-page indictment charges 17 homicides, 11 attempted homicides, and four kidnappings, all allegedly committed between 1976 and March 1980.
- Apr. 19      Police arrest 13 suspected BR terrorists in northern Italy.
- Apr. 27      In Naples three BR terrorists, aided by up to a dozen others, shot dead a politician and his driver Tuesday on a clogged street, using diamond-tipped bullets to penetrate the windows of an armored limousine. It was the first street killing of the year by the BR, and proved Italian police did not wipe out the organization in a crackdown following the Jan. 28 freeing of US Army General Dozier from their captivity.
- Apr. 29      Antonio Savasta, a BR member turned state's evidence, testified at the Moro murder trial that the BR received two large weapons shipments from the PLO in 1978 and 1979. The weapons were in exchange for promises to attack Israeli targets in Europe.
- May    3      Antonio Savasta testifying at the Moro murder trial said "...the police could have saved the life of Moro if they had investigated as thoroughly as they did in the Dozier case". He also acknowledged that at the height of the BR's strength, 20,000 to 25,000 "regulars".
- May    26      Carlo Brogi, a member of the BR and former Alitalia airline steward, testified he bought guns and grenade throwers in New York for use by the BR. He also acknowledged BR contacts with West German, French, and Irish terrorist groups.
- May    30      Marcello Capuano, one of Dozier's kidnappers convicted in absentia, was arrested in Rome.
- Jun. 28      Italian police are indicted on charges of mistreating BR prisoners.

## APPENDIX B

### Terrorists of the Left Imprisoned, Indicted, or Identified (as of 1 July 1982)\*

Red Brigades (BR)	495
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)	213
Front Line (PL)	307
Revolutionary Action (AR)	47
Communist Combat Units (UCC)	32
Other	<u>122</u>
TOTAL	1216

\*The figures given for this table are extrapolations taken from a survey of newspaper accounts, journal articles, etc. Their complete accuracy can not be verified; however, as far as known (published) accounts, they are as precise as possible.

## APPENDIX C

### Terrorist Activity in Italy:

#### 3 Major Leftist Groups

(as of 1 July 1982)\*

	BR	NAP	PL
Total #	454	118	98
Months of Activity	142	95	68
a) Mass murder (including attempts)	0	0	0
b) Homicide (including attempts)	57	3	6
c) Wounding (including attempts)	71	13	9
d) Kidnappng (long term)	6	0	0
e) Kidnappng (short term)	14	3	0
f) Dynamiting	34	40	21
g) Robberies, thefts, extorsions	27	7	8
h) Breaking and entering (homes & offices)	29	9	20
i) Aggressions	5	3	3
j) Demonstrative damages	211	40	31

\*The figures given for this table are extrapolations taken from a survey of newspaper accounts, journal articles, etc. Their complete accuracy can not be verified; however, as far as known (published) accounts, they are as precise as possible.

## APPENDIX D

### The BR Historic Nucleus:

### Their Beginnings and Ends

\*Renato Curcio (the "founding father")

-In the fall of 1969 joined the extraparliamentary group of the Left called the Metropolitan Political Collective (Collettivo Politico Metropolitan - CPM).

-Currently in prison.

\*Margherita "Mara" Cagol (Curcio's wife)

-Also a member of CPM.

-Killed in a shootout with police on 4 June 1975.

\*Giorgio Semeria

-A student activist at the University of Trento.

-Currently in prison.

\*Mario Moretti

-A sit-Siemens employee actively involved in a "ultra-leftist" study group operating within the plant.

-Currently in prison.

\*Pier Luigi Zuffada

-Also in Sit-Siemens



-Currently in prison.

\*Paola Besuschio

-Also in Sit-Siemens.

-Currently in prison.

\*Corrado Alunni

-Sit-Siemens activist and study group leader.

-Currently in prison.

\*Alberto Franceshini

-Beginnings in PCI from Reggio Emilia.

-Currently in prison.

\*Fabrizio Pelli

-PCI member from Reggio Emilia.

-Currently in prison.

\*Roberto Ognibene

-Student activist from Reggio Emilia.

-Currently in prison.

\*Propero Gallinari

-PCI member/activist.

-Currently in prison.

\*Tonino Loris Paroli

- PCI background.
- Currently in prison.

\*Lauro Azzolini

- PCI activist.
- Currently in prison.

\*Paolo Maurizio Ferrari

- Pirelli employee and member of the extraparliamentary "rank-and-file unitary committees".
- Currently in prison.

\*Massimo Maraschi

- Member hardline political collective "La Comune".
- Unknown.

\*Piero Bassi

- Member "La Comune".
- Currently in prison.

\*Pietro Bertolozzi

- Member "La Comune".
- Currently in prison.

\*Pietro Morlacchi

- PCI member and later a cofounder of one of the first groups of the Stalinist extraparliamentary Left.
- Unknown.

\*Franco Simeoni

-An employee and activist in Mondadori.

-Currently in prison.

\*Franco Trojano


A worker at Pirelli and a leader of the "workers-students movement". Also, editor of the Leftist newspaper New Resistance (Nuova Resistenza).

-Currently in prison.


APPENDIX E

BR Development Continuum


Student & Worker Unrest  
(1963-1969)




Development of the CPM  
(1968-1969)




CPM Chiavari Conference -  
"vowing to launch an offensive  
against the entire Establishment  
and to contribute to the European  
revolutionary struggle".  
(December 1969)




Internal disputes plague CPM:  
soft, non-violent view vs.  
"armed struggle".  
(1970)




The opposing CPM factions split.  
(October 1970)





Those who espoused the hardline gave birth to the BR. (Curcio was in the forefront of the establishment.)



The non-violent organization changed the name to "Proletarian Left (Sinistra Proletaria - SP)".

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(Listings are by newspaper and are in chronological order, with the page on which the article appears. For example, Times (New York), 2:5 July 1977. The article appears in the 2 July edition on page 5. Sections are noted by either letter or Roman numeral designation.)

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Abstract  
of  
THE RED BRIGADES:  
A DESCRIPTION OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION  
by  
Larry Allen Buckingham

Statement of Problem

A review of current literature on active terrorist or revolutionary organizations reveals minimal information for analyzing the Red Brigades (BR) of Italy. Questions such as how they are organized, the number of active members, their age, origin, educational background, and political orientation are largely unanswered in a collective form. The purpose of this study is to present a descriptive analysis of the Red Brigades. A secondary purpose is to present a study which enables the criminologist, sociologist, and politician to better understand the organization in order to develop techniques for dealing with the demands for social and governmental change through terrorist activity.

Sources of Data

The scope of this study will include a systematic review of the popular literature (US, Italian, and German) on the topic. Although, the majority of material published on the group deals with the sensationalism of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination and the General Dozier abduction, other documents do exist in a scattered form. By compiling and analysing these items, a better view of the BR was obtained.

### Conclusions Reached

The Red Brigades are a highly active, well equipped, disciplined, and strongly effective terrorist organization. Their role in the Italian Left began as a part of the social unrest of the late 1960s. The majority of members have prior connections to the Italian Communist Party, and tend to follow a Marxist-Leninist ideology. The continued life of the group can be tied to a low-level of support from many young Italians. Outside of Italy, the group has many international ties to other terrorist groups and Soviet bloc countries, which also provide additional support for the group's acts. Because of past successes and the strong operational base the group has established in both national and transnational arenas, operations by the group can be expected to continue.

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